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PLAINTIFF, WHO FELL FROM A HORSE, COULD SUE UNDER STANDARD PRINCIPLES OF NEGLIGENCE, AS OPPOSED TO THE STRICT LIABILITY THEORY IN THE AGRICULTURE AND MARKETS LAW; PLAINTIFF’S SUIT WAS PRECLUDED BY THE ASSUMPTION OF THE RISK DOCTRINE (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined standard negligence principles, not strict liability, applied to this falling-off-a-horse case. Plaintiff, who fell from the horse when the horse stopped suddenly, assumed the risk of such an injury:

Defendant argues that, because the injury at issue was caused by a horse — a domestic animal — plaintiff may only sue in strict liability (see Agriculture and Markets Law § 108 [7]; … ). However, where a plaintiff suffers injuries stemming from horseback riding, such as here, the plaintiff may bring suit against the owner of the horse under traditional negligence standards … . Regardless, the primary assumption of risk doctrine functions as a “principle of no duty,” serving to “den[y] the existence of any underlying cause of action” … . Stanhope v Burke, 2023 NY Slip Op 05427, Third Dept 10-26-23

Practice Point: Plaintiff could maintain a standard negligence action against to owner of a horse stemming from plaintiff’s fall from the horse, as opposed to a strict liability action pursuant to the Agriculture and Markets Law.

Practice Point: Whether plaintiff sued in negligence or strict liability, the assumption of risk doctrine would apply to preclude the action.

 

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