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PLAINTIFF’S COUNSEL SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISQUALIFIED PURSUANT TO THE ADVOCATE-WITNESS RULE, CRITERIA EXPLAINED (SECOND DEPT). ​

The Second Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined plaintiff’s (Gamez’s) counsel should not have been disqualified pursuant to the advocate-witness rule:

“[T]he disqualification of an attorney is a matter which rests within the sound discretion of the court. A party’s entitlement to be represented in ongoing litigation by counsel of his or her own choosing is a valued right which should not be abridged absent a clear showing that disqualification is warranted, and the movant bears the burden on the motion” … . A party moving to disqualify counsel on the ground that he or she may be called as a witness must demonstrate that (1) the testimony of the opposing party’s counsel is necessary to his or her case, and (2) such testimony would be prejudicial to the opposing party … . “Testimony may be relevant and even highly useful but still not strictly necessary. A finding of necessity takes into account such factors as the significance of the matters, weight of the testimony, and availability of other evidence” … . Here, Lopez [defendant] failed to demonstrate that any anticipated testimony by Gamez’s counsel would be necessary to Lopez’s case and that such testimony would be prejudicial to Gamez … . Gamez v Lopez, 2023 NY Slip Op 05250, Second Dept 10-18-23

Practice Point: The criteria for the disqualification of counsel pursuant to the advocate-witness rule were not met here. The testimony of the opposing party’s counsel must be necessary to the moving party’s case, and the testimony must be prejudicial to the opposing party.

 

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