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DEFENDANT-PETITIONER WAS ENTITLED TO RELEASE FROM PRE-INDICTMENT CUSTODY PURSUANT TO CPL 30.30 (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the habeas corpus petition seeking defendant-petitioner’s release from pre-indictment custody should have been granted:

… [P]etitioner demonstrated that more than 90 days elapsed from the commencement of the defendant’s confinement on April 27, 2023, until July 31, 2023, the date the petitioner made an application to the Supreme Court pursuant to CPL 30.30(2)(a) for the defendant’s release. The Supreme Court nonetheless denied the petitioner’s application, concluding that the People were entitled to exclude an unspecified period of time attributable to a delay in satisfying their obligation to produce relevant portions of the grand jury minutes. The People asserted that this delay in complying with their obligation pursuant to CPL 245.20(1)(b) was caused by a backlog on the part of a court reporter in producing the minutes. The Supreme Court incorrectly determined that the circumstances surrounding the People’s production of the minutes constituted excludable delay, whether based on exceptional circumstances or some other ground set forth in CPL 30.30(4). Among other reasons, the People failed to demonstrate that the timing of the production of the minutes was beyond their control, or that they engaged in diligent efforts to produce the outstanding discovery by their trial readiness deadline … . People ex rel. Fast v Molina, 2023 NY Slip Op 04641, Second Dept 9-20-23

Practice Point: Here the reasons provided by the People for their inability to be ready for trial should not have been deemed adequate to meet the criteria for excludable delay pursuant to CPL 30.30.

 

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