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THERE WAS NO REASONABLE VIEW OF THE EVIDENCE WHICH SUPPORTED THE JURY’S CONCLUSION THE BUS DRIVER WAS NOT NEGLIGENT IN THIS BUS-PEDESTRIAN ACCIDENT CASE; THE MOTION TO SET ASIDE THE DEFENSE VERDICT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the motion to set aside the defense verdict in this bus-pedestrian accident case should have been granted:

A jury verdict in favor of a defendant should be set aside as contrary to the weight of the evidence where the evidence preponderates so heavily in the plaintiff’s favor that it could not have been reached by any fair interpretation of the evidence … . “A driver . . . has ‘a statutory duty to use due care to avoid colliding with pedestrians on the roadway (see Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1146), as well as a common-law duty to see that which he [or she] should have seen through the proper use of his [or her] senses'” … .

Here, no fair interpretation of the evidence supports a finding that Ramirez was free from negligence in the happening of this accident. Although it is unclear whether the plaintiff was crossing the entrance ramp in or near the crosswalk at the time that she was struck, Ramirez’s failure to observe the plaintiff crossing the entrance ramp at the time of the accident was a violation of his common-law duty to see that which he should have seen through the proper use of his senses … . Under these circumstances, the jury’s verdict that Ramirez was free from negligence was not supported by any fair interpretation of the evidence. Wargold v Hudson Tr. Lines, Inc., 2023 NY Slip Op 04153, Second Dept 8-2-23

Practice Point: A driver has a common law duty to see what he should have seen. The motion to set aside the defense verdict in this bus-pedestrian accident case should have been granted.

 

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