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UNDER THE “AGE 29 LAW” MEDICAL-INSURANCE COVERAGE FOR PLAINTIFF’S CHILD WAS AVAILABLE THROUGH PLAINTIFF’S EMPLOYER’S PLAN UNTIL THE CHILD TURNED 29; THEREFORE THE STIPULATED ORDER IN THE DIVORCE PROCEEDING REQUIRING PLAINTIFF TO COVER THE CHILD UNDER THE PLAN FOR AS LONG AS THE LAW ALLOWS REQUIRED COVERAGE TO AGE 29; THE ARGUMENT THAT THE PARTIES CONTEMPLATED A CUT-OFF AT AGE 26 PURSUANT TO THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT WAS REJECTED (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Higgitt, determined the provisions of a stipulated order in a divorce proceeding (section 6.3)  providing that plaintiff would pay for medical insurance for a child (T.D.) for as long as coverage was available under the employer’s family plan were unambiguous and must be enforced. Because the “Age 29” law allowed the child to remain covered by plaintiff’s employer’s plan until age 29. plaintiff was obligated to pay for that coverage. The argument that the provision was ambiguous allowing extrinsic evidence that the parties contemplated only the Affordable Care Act’s cut-off at age 26 was rejected: The “Age 29” act was passed before the issuance of the stipulated order:

… [T]he practical and reasonable interpretation of § 6.3 is that, to the extent plaintiff can maintain health insurance for T.D. through his employer, he is required to do so as long as any relevant law permits coverage for T.D. As he acknowledges in his brief (and as the evidence he submitted in opposition to the motion establishes), T.D. has coverage under the same health insurance plan provided by plaintiff’s employer to its employees. Thus, by virtue of the fact that plaintiff has health insurance through his employer, Age 29 Law coverage is available to T.D. B.D. v E.D., 2023 NY Slip Op 03971, First Dept 7-27-23

Practice Point: Here the stipulated order entered in the divorce proceedings required plaintiff to provide medical insurance to the child as long as the child could be covered by law under the employer’s plan. The Age 29 Law allowed coverage until age 29. The argument that the stipulated order was ambiguous allowing extrinsic proof that the parties contemplated only the age 26 cut-off under the Affordable Care Act was rejected.

 

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