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​REMOVING SCAFFOLDS, LADDERS, ETC. FROM THE WORKSITE WAS “ANCILLARY” TO THE RENOVATION WORK AND THEREFORE PROTECTED BY LABOR LAW 240(1); THERE WAS A QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER PLAINTIFF’S FALLING OFF THE TOP OF THE VAN WHERE HE WAS LOADING THE EQUIPMENT WAS COVERED BY LABOR LAW 240(1) (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined plaintiff’s task of removing equipment (scaffolds, ladders, poles, etc.) from the worksite and loading them onto the top of a van was ancillary to the renovation work and therefore encompassed by Labor Law 240(1). Plaintiff fell from the roof of the van:

… [T]he defendants’ submissions failed to demonstrate, as a matter of law, that the plaintiff’s activity in removing equipment from the worksite and loading it onto the van was not performed as part of the larger renovation project that CDI had been hired to complete on the premises, including roofing and shingling work. The plaintiff’s role in removing the equipment after it had been used by the plaintiff and his CDI colleagues was an act “ancillary” to the alteration of the structure at the property, and protected under Labor Law § 240(1) … .

The defendants also failed to adduce any evidence demonstrating that climbing on the roof of the van was not necessary to the task of securing the equipment on the roof, nor did they demonstrate that no safety device enumerated in Labor Law § 240(1) would have prevented the plaintiff’s fall. Ramones v 425 County Rd., LLC, 2023 NY Slip Op 03489, Second Dept 6-28-23

Practice Point: Removing scaffolding, ladders, etc. after use on the worksite was “ancillary” to the renovation work and therefore protected by Labor Law 240(1).

Practice Point: Falling from the top of a van where equipment removed from the worksite was being loaded may be compensable under Labor Law 240(1) (there was a question of fact on that issue).

 

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