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AFTER PLAINTIFFS’ CAR WAS SERVICED, A TIRE (WHEEL?) FELL OFF, CAUSING AN ACCIDENT; THE PLAINTIFFS WERE ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE RES IPSA LOQUITUR THEORY OF LIABILITY (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment based upon the res ipsa loquitur theory of liability should have been granted. Plaintiffs’ car was inspected by defendant car dealership and the tires (wheels?) were removed and reattached. When plaintiff Kathleen Becchetti drove the car from the dealership one of the tires (wheels?) detached causing an accident:

For the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur to apply, a plaintiff must establish three conditions: “[f]irst, the event must be of a kind that ordinarily does not occur in the absence of someone’s negligence; second, it must be caused by an agency or instrumentality within the exclusive control of the defendant; and third, it must not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution on the part of the plaintiff” … . Regarding the second element, exclusive control is not a rigid rule and has been applied in circumstances when “the accident occurred after the instrumentality left the defendant’s control, where it was shown that the defendant had exclusive control at the time of the alleged act of negligence” … . The plaintiff does not need to eliminate all other causes, but, rather, must show that their likelihood is reduced so that the defendants’ conduct is more probably the cause … . The plaintiff must show that the defendant’s control was sufficiently exclusive to fairly rule out some other agency causing the purported defect … . Once the plaintiff satisfies the burden of proof on these three elements, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur permits the factfinder to infer negligence … .

Here, the plaintiffs established, prima facie, that a tire detachment, such as the one at issue here, does not occur in the absence of negligence … . Furthermore, the plaintiffs established, prima facie, that the vehicle was in the defendants’ exclusive control at the time of the alleged act of negligence … and that the plaintiffs did not contribute to the event … . …

… [S]ince this is the type of “rare” and “exceptional” res ipsa loquitur case “in which no facts are left for determination” … , the Supreme Court should have granted the plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment on the issue of liability. Bicchetti v Atlantic Toyota, 2023 NY Slip Op 03219, Second Dept 6-14-23

Practice Point: Here a wheel fell off plaintiffs’ car after the car was serviced, causing an accident. Although the car was not in the exclusive control of the dealership when the wheel fell off, the negligence occurred when the dealership had exclusive control. This was deemed a rare case warranting summary judgment.

 

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