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THE “NO ACTION” PROVISION IN THE CONTRACT PRECLUDED PLAINTIFFS FROM BRINGING A JUDICIAL BREACH OF CONTRACT ACTION; THE AVAILABLE CONTRACTUAL REMEDIES WERE DEEMED EXCLUSIVE (FIRST DEPT). ​

The First Department, reversing the appellate division, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Oing, over a two-justice dissent, determined the complaint seeking a judicial determination whether the contingent resource payment (CRP) agreement was breached when Exxon purchased InterOil Corporation was properly dismissed. Exxon successfully argued that plaintiffs’ only recourse was contractual under the terms of the CRP. The opinion is far too detailed to fairly summarize here:

[The CRP] § 8.05’s penultimate sentence not only provides that plaintiffs cannot bring a class action to challenge any aspect of the CRP agreement, but it also bars them from bringing any action or proceeding altogether, “[n]otwithstanding anything to the contrary in this Agreement . . . no individual Holder or other group of Holders will be entitled to exercise such rights.” Such “rights,” written in the plural as opposed to in the singular, refer to those set out in the beginning of the sentence — namely, “institut[ing] any action or proceeding at law or in equity or in bankruptcy or otherwise upon or under or with respect to this Agreement.” Mulacek v ExxonMobil Corp., 2023 NY Slip Op 02829, First De[t 5-25-23

Practice Point: Here a provision in the contract providing that no court action for breach of contract could be brought, a so-called “no action” clause, precluded plaintiffs’ lawsuit.

 

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