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THE JUDGE DID NOT HAVE THE AUTHORITY TO, SUA SPONTE, DISMISS THE FORECLOSURE COMPLAINT FOR PLAINTIFF’S ALLEGED FAILURE TO APPEAR AT A STATUS CONFERENCE AND COMPLY WITH THE DIRECTIVE TO MOVE FOR AN ORDER OF REFERENCE BY A SPECIFIED DATE; PRECEDENT TO THE CONTRARY SHOULD NO LONGER BE FOLLOWED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, rejecting its own precedent in this foreclosure action, determined the judge did not have the authority to, sua sponte, dismiss the complaint for plaintiff’s failure to comply with the directive to appear at a status conference and move for an order of reference by a specified date:

“A court’s power to dismiss a complaint, sua sponte, is to be used sparingly and only when extraordinary circumstances exist to warrant dismissal” … . The plaintiff’s failure to comply with the directive in the order dated September 13, 2017, was not a sufficient ground upon which to direct dismissal of the complaint … . Moreover, the court was without authority to, sua sponte, direct dismissal of the complaint based upon the plaintiff’s failure to comply with its directive to proceed by motion where, as here, the plaintiff was entitled to proceed either by motion or trial … . …

… 22 NYCRR 202.27 was not a proper basis for directing dismissal of the complaint … . Where a party appears as scheduled, 22 NYCRR 202.27 “provides no basis for the court to summarily dismiss the action for failure to prosecute” … . Nothing in the record establishes that the plaintiff did not appear or was not ready to proceed at the final status conference … . To the extent our cases have held that a failure to comply with a directive in a prior status conference order amounts to a nonappearance at the status conference or a failure to announce readiness to proceed “immediately or subject to the engagement of counsel” within the meaning of 22 NYCRR 202.27 … , such cases should no longer be followed … . “In general, [t]he procedural device of dismissing a complaint for undue delay is a legislative creation, and courts do not possess the inherent power to dismiss an action for general delay” … where, as here, the statutory preconditions to dismissal under CPLR 3216, which is the statutory provision addressing “[w]ant of prosecution,” have not been met…. . U.S. Bank N.A. v Bhagwandeen, 2023 NY Slip Op 02349, Second Dept 5-3-23

Practice Point: A judge’s authority to dismiss a complaint in the absence of the statutory conditions in CPLR 3216 (failure to prosecute) is extremely limited. Here in this foreclosure action the Second Department rejected its own precedent and held plaintiff’s alleged failure to appear at a status conference and comply with the directive to move for an order of reference by a specified date did not justify the sua-sponte dismissal of the complaint.

 

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