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​ NEW YORK HAS LONG-ARM JURISDICTION OVER A SINGLE ALLEGED ACT OF SEXUAL ABUSE WHICH OCCURRED IN NEW YORK IN 1975 OR 1976 WHEN PLAINTIFF WAS ON A FIELD TRIP; THE ACTION WAS BROUGHT BY A CONNECTICUT RESIDENT AGAINST A CONNECTICUT DEFENDANT AND ALLEGED SEVERAL OTHER ACTS OF ABUSE WHICH TOOK PLACE IN CONNECTICUT; BECAUSE THE ALLEGED TORT TOOK PLACE IN NEW YORK, THE CONNECTICUT PLAINTIFF CAN TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THE EXTENDED STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS IN NEW YORK’S CHILD VICTIMS ACT (SECOND DEPT).

​The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Christopher, determined a single alleged act of sexual abuse which took place during a field trip to New York from Connecticut, involving a Connecticut-resident plaintiff and a Connecticut defendant, was sufficient for long-arm jurisdiction in New York. Plaintiff alleged defendant Boys and Girls Club of Greenwich, Inc failed to properly supervise club activities and, as a result, plaintiff was abused on several occasions by a member of the club. Only one of the alleged instances of abuse took place in New York. Although plaintiff is a Connecticut resident, the court ruled plaintiff could take advantage of the extended statute of limitations in New York’s Child Victims Act because the alleged tort took place in New York.

Where, as here, the plaintiff has established the requisite minimum contacts, as previously set forth, we must then engage in the second part of the due process inquiry; that is, whether defending a suit in New York comports with “traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice” … .  Here, the Club has failed to present a “compelling case” that some other consideration would render jurisdiction unreasonable … . … [T]he exercise of jurisdiction over the Club in New York would “comport with ‘fair play and substantial justice'” … . * * * 

With regard to CPLR 214-g, the revival statute, enacted under the Child Victims Act, S.H. v Diocese of Brooklyn (205 AD3d 180), does not preclude determining that it is appropriate for New York to exercise long-arm jurisdiction in this case. While S.H. discussed the legislative history of the revival statute and found that the history supports the proposition that the statute was enacted for the benefit of New York residents, this was in the context of the facts of S.H., wherein the alleged acts of abuse occurred in Florida. In S.H. we held, “that under the circumstances of this case, CPLR 214-g is not available to nonresident plaintiffs where the alleged acts of abuse occurred outside New York” … . In the instant case, while the plaintiff is not a New York resident, unlike the situation in S.H., the alleged abuse occurred in New York. 

We note that our finding that the Club is subject to personal jurisdiction pursuant to CPLR 302(a)(2) is limited to the one act of sexual abuse alleged to have occurred in New York. WCVAWCK-Doe v Boys & Girls Club of Greenwich, Inc., 2023 NY Slip Op 02026, Second Dept 4-19-23

Practice Point: Here a Connecticut resident sued a Connecticut defendant alleging several acts of sexual abuse in 1975 or 1976. Most of the alleged abuse took place in Connecticut. One alleged instance of abuse took place when plaintiff was on a field trip to New York. New York has long-arm jurisdiction over that tort, and the Connecticut plaintiff can take advantage of the extended statute of limitations in the Child Victims Act based on the situs of that single instance of abuse. The opinion should be consulted for its comprehensive analysis of jurisdiction under the long-arm statute.

 

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