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THE EXTENDED STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS IN THE CHILD VICTIMS ACT DOES NOT APPLY TO CIVIL RIGHTS CAUSES OF ACTION PURSUANT TO 42 USC 1983; THE DUTY TO REPORT CHILD ABUSE UNDER THE SOCIAL SERVICES LAW APPLIES ONLY TO “PERSONS LEGALLY RESPONSIBLE” FOR THE CARE OF THE CHILD, WHICH DOES NOT INCLUDE TEACHERS (THIRD DEPT).

​The Third Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Aarons, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined the negligence and civil rights causes of action against the school district in this Child Victims Act suit were properly dismissed, and the Social Services Law causes of action should have been dismissed. The complaints alleged sexual abuse by a teacher. The Third Department followed the Fourth Department holding that the extended statute of limitations in the Child Victims Act did not apply to the 42 USC 1983 civil rights causes of action. The Third Department also determined the teacher was not a “person legally responsible” for the plaintiffs such that the abuse-reporting requirement in the Social Services Law applied to the school district:

It is true that CPLR 214-g contains broad language. The statute nonetheless limits the types of causes of action — i.e., claims involving child sexual abuse — that are revived and then given a new limitations period. … 42 USC § 1983 does not create any independent, substantive rights but merely provides a vehicle to enforce such rights … . As the Fourth Department reasoned, to determine whether CPLR 214-g was a related revival statute would require a court to impermissibly consider the particular facts or particular legal theory advanced by a plaintiff in a section 1983 claim (see BL Doe 3 v Female Academy of the Sacred Heart, 199 AD3d at 1422). Accordingly, we decline plaintiffs’ invitation to reject the Fourth Department’s approach as articulated in BL Doe 3 v Female Academy of the Sacred Heart … . * * *

… [C]ertain individuals must report cases of suspected abuse when reasonable cause exists that a child coming before them is an abused child (see Social Services Law § 413). Civil liability may be imposed upon these individuals who knowingly and willfully fail to make the requisite report (see Social Services Law § 420 [2]). … [F]or purposes of Social Services Law § 413, an “abused child” is one who is abused by a “parent or other person legally responsible for [a child’s] care” (Family Ct Act § 1012 [e]; see Social Services Law § 412 [1]).

The School District maintains that plaintiffs’ statutory claim should have been dismissed because Wales [defendant teacher] was not a “person legally responsible” for plaintiffs’ care at the time of the alleged abuse. … [W]hether an individual constitutes a “person legally responsible” for a child within the meaning of Family Ct Act § 1012 (e) entails the examination of various factors … . The Court of Appeals cautioned … that “persons who assume fleeting or temporary care of a child . . . or those persons who provide extended daily care of children in institutional settings, such as teachers,” should not be interpreted as a “person legally responsible” for a child’s care … . … [T]he School District cannot be liable for any alleged failure to report any abuse by Wales … . Dolgas v Wales, 2023 NY Slip Op 01830, Third Dept 4-6-23

Practice Point: Here the school district was sued under the Child Victims Act alleging sexual abuse by a teacher. The civil rights causes of action pursuant to 42 USC 1983 are not subject to the extended statute of limitations in the Child Victims Act and, therefore, those causes of action were properly dismissed.

Practice Point: A teacher is not a “person legally responsible” for the care of a child within the meaning of the Family Court Act. Therefore the causes of action under the Social Services Law alleging the school district failed to report abuse by a teacher should have been dismissed.

 

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