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IF A PREMATURE CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE WITH DISCOVERY OBLIGATIONS WAS NOT FILED IN GOOD FAITH, THE STATEMENT OF READINESS FOR TRIAL IS ILLUSORY; MATTER REMITTED FOR A DETERMINATION WHETHER THE CERTIFICATE WAS FILED IN GOOD FAITH; THE JUDGE CONSIDERED ONLY WHETHER DEFENDANT WAS PREJUDICED BY THE POST-CERTIFICATE PRODUCTION OF DISCOVERY (FOURTH DEPT). ​

The Fourth Department, remitting the matter, found the judge applied the wrong criteria for determining whether the People’s premature filling of the certificate of compliance with discovery obligations (CPL 245.50) rendered the ready-for-trial announcement illusory:

… [T]he criminal action was commenced on June 9, 2021 (see CPL 1.20 [17]). The People filed their certificate of compliance and statement of readiness on August 6, 2021. On February 12, 2022, defendant moved to dismiss the indictment on speedy trial grounds, arguing that the People’s failure to provide all of the discovery required by CPL 245.20 rendered the certificate of compliance improper and the statement of readiness illusory. Defendant argued that the People should be charged with the entire eight month period and that the indictment should be dismissed (see CPL 30.30 [1] [a]). The court denied defendant’s motion, concluding that the People’s certificate of compliance was proper because defendant had not been prejudiced by the People’s belated disclosure of certain required discovery and that the statement of readiness therefore was not illusory.

… [T]he court’s use of a prejudice-only standard for evaluating the propriety of the certificate of compliance was error because the clear and unambiguous terms of CPL 245.50 establish that a certificate of compliance is proper where its filing is “in good faith and reasonable under the circumstances” … . On a CPL 30.30 motion, the question is not whether defendant was prejudiced by an improper certificate of compliance … . … In light of the court’s failure to consider whether the People’s certificate of compliance was filed in “good faith and reasonable under the circumstances” despite the belated discovery, we hold the case, reserve decision, and remit the matter to Supreme Court to determine whether the People’s certificate of compliance was proper under the terms of CPL 245.50 and thus whether the statement of readiness was valid. People v Gaskin, 2023 NY Slip Op 01415, Fourth Dept 3-17-23

Practice Point: If the People file a certificate of compliance with discovery obligations before discovery is complete the readiness-for-trial statement may be rendered illusory. The judge must determine whether the certificate was filed in good faith, not whether defendant was prejudiced by the post-certificate discovery.

 

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