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​ BY THE TERMS OF HIS LEASE, PLAINTIFF WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR SNOW AND ICE REMOVAL IN THIS SLIP AND FALL CASE; THE OUT–OF-POSSESSION LANDLORDS WERE NOT RESPONSIBLE AND THEIR MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).

​The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendants-out-of-possession landlords were not responsible for snow and ice removal in the area where plaintiff slipped and fell, In fact, plaintiff, by the terms of his lease, was responsible for the snow and ice removal:

… [T]he defendants demonstrated, prima facie, that they were out-of-possession landlords who were not contractually obligated to remove snow and ice from the subject driveway, that they did not assume such a duty through a course of conduct, and that they did not violate any relevant statute or regulation … . In opposition, the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether the defendants had a duty to remove snow or ice under statute or regulation, the terms of the lease, or a course of conduct … . Sweeney v Hoey, 2022 NY Slip Op 07471, Second Dept 12-28-22

Practice Point: Here the out-of-possession landlords were not responsible for snow and ice removal in the are where plaintiff-tenant fell. In fact, plaintiff, by the terms of his lease was himself responsible for the snow and ice removal.

 

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