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INSTALLING A TV ON A WALL IS NOT AN ACTIVITY COVERED BY LABOR LAW 240(1) (SECOND DEPT).

​The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendants’ motions for summary judgment dismissing the Labor law 240(1) cause of action should have been granted. Plaintiff fell from an A-frame ladder while attempting to install a television on a wall in a doctor’s office:

Labor Law § 240(1) states that all contractors, owners, and their agents must supply protective equipment to laborers who are engaged in the “erection, demolition, repairing, altering, painting, cleaning or pointing of a building” … . As such, “[t]o successfully assert a cause of action under Labor Law § 240(1), a plaintiff must establish that he or she was injured during ‘the erection, demolition, repairing, altering, painting, cleaning or pointing of a building or structure'” … . “[T]he term ‘altering’ in section 240(1) ‘requires making a significant physical change to the configuration or composition of the building or structure'” … . This definition excludes “‘routine maintenance'” and “‘decorative modifications'” … ,

The defendants established that the plaintiff was not engaged in any of the enumerated activities under Labor Law § 240(1). Contrary to the plaintiff’s contention, affixing a bracket to a wall so that a television might be mounted on it did not make a “significant physical change to the configuration or composition of the building or structure”  … . Saitta v Marsah Props., LLC, 2022 NY Slip Op 07467, Second Dept 12-28-22

Practice Point: Installing a TV on a wall is not one of the activities covered by Labor Law 240(1).

 

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