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PLAINTIFF-TENANT’S COMPLAINT ALLEGED DEFENDANT-LANDLORD’S STIPULATION WITH THE PRIOR TENANT IN 2000 ILLEGALLY DECONTROLLED THE APARTMENT; THE MAJORITY DISMISSED THE COMPLAINT; TWO-JUSTICE DISSENT (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, over a two-justice dissent, determined plaintiff’s complaint should have been dismissed. “Plaintiff, the current tenant of the subject apartment, commenced this action seeking a declaration that her tenancy is subject to the Rent Stabilization Law (RSL) and that the premises were illegally decontrolled in 2000 when defendant owner and nonparty Edward McKinney reached a ‘private agreement’ circumventing initial rent registration procedures for decontrolling the apartment.” The decision and the dissent are detailed and fact-specific and cannot be fairly summarized here:

An agreement by a tenant to waive the benefit of any provision of the rent control law is expressly prohibited and void (9 NYCRR 2200.15 …). However, when McKinney and defendant settled their dispute over McKinney’s status, McKinney was not a tenant … . He was not on the lease and had no evident rights, other than being an occupant of the apartment who claimed that he had succession rights when Brown died. … Defendant, on the other hand, denied that McKinney was anything other than a squatter/licensee or possible roommate of the deceased. By entering into the 2000 stipulation, both sides, represented by counsel, resolved their dispute as to whether McKinney had any statutory right to the apartment. By doing so, McKinney and defendant chose the certainty of settlement, rather than the uncertainty of a judicial declaration about McKinney’s status … .

From the dissent:

… I would find that plaintiff has sufficiently pleaded that the stipulation that McKinney and defendant executed in 2000 (the 2000 stipulation) was void under applicable statutes, as interpreted by our Court and the Court of Appeals. Accordingly, I would vote to affirm the portion of the motion court’s decision that denied defendant’s motion to dismiss the first, third and fourth causes of action. Liggett v Lew Realty LLC, 2022 NY Slip Op 07000, First Dept 12-8-22

Practice Point: Plaintiff-tenant alleged defendant-landlord illegally decontrolled the apartment in 2000 by entering an agreement (a stipulation) with the prior tenant. The majority held the complaint did not state a cause of action. The two dissenters disagreed.

 

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