You are here: / / ALTHOUGH THE JUDGE CAN PROPERLY AWARD COUNSEL FEES TO PETITIONER BASED...
, ,

ALTHOUGH THE JUDGE CAN PROPERLY AWARD COUNSEL FEES TO PETITIONER BASED UPON RESPONDENT’S VIOLATION OF AN ORDER OF PROTECTION, A HEARING IS NECESSARY TO DETERMINE THE AMOUNT OF THE FEE (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined that the judge properly exercised discretion in awarding counsel fees to petitioner based upon appellant’s (Gorish’s) violation of an order of protection. However, the amount of counsel fees should have been determined by a hearing:

Under Family Court Act § 846-a, the court “may order the respondent to pay the petitioner’s reasonable and necessary counsel fees in connection with the violation petition where the court finds that the violation of its order was willful.” “The award of counsel fees is committed to the discretion of the Family Court” … . “[T]he reasonable amount and nature of the claimed services must be established at an adversarial hearing” … . Here, while the Family Court providently exercised its discretion in awarding counsel fees to the petitioner, the court erred in determining the amount of the counsel fees without a hearing. Matter of Sicina v Gorish, 2022 NY Slip Op 05535, Second Dept 10-5-22

Practice Point: The violation of an order of protection is a proper ground for awarding counsel fees to the petitioner, but the amount must be determined by a hearing.

 

You might also like
Lack of Standing Defense Waived If Not Raised In Answer or Pre-Answer Motion to Dismiss—Lack of Standing Is Not a Jurisdictional Defect–Sua Sponte Dismissal on that Ground Improper
THE AFFIDAVITS SUBMITTED BY THE BANK IN THIS FORECLOSURE ACTION DID NOT DEMONSTRATE COMPLIANCE WITH THE NOTICE REQUIREMENTS OF RPAPL 1304 (SECOND DEPT).
Subcontractor Which Did Not Supervise Injured Plaintiff or Control Site Safety May Still Be Liable Under Common-Law Negligence for Creating the Dangerous Condition
Failure to Allege a Favorable Result Would Have Obtained “But For” the Attorney’s Alleged Malpractice Required Dismissal of the Complaint
Criteria for Collateral Estoppel Explained (Criteria Not Met Here)
ZONING BOARD’S DENIAL OF APPLICATION FOR SITE PLAN APPROVAL ANNULLED, BOARD’S DETERMINATION BASED SOLELY ON GENERALIZED COMMUNITY OPPOSITION.
IT WAS AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION TO DENY FATHER’S MOTION TO VACATE HIS DEFAULT IN THIS CUSTODY CASE; THE USUAL RULES FOR VACATION OF A DEFAULT ARE RELAXED IN CHILD CUSTODY MATTERS (SECOND DEPT).
Six-Year Statute of Limitations for Reformation of Deed Exceeded, No Evidence the Exception to the Statute Applied

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

EVEN THOUGH FATHER REFUSED TO COOPERATE WITH AN INVESTIGATION RELATED TO HIS... DEFENDANT MOVED TO VACATE HIS CONVICTION BY GUILTY PLEA ON THE GROUND HE WAS...