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ONCE PLAINTIFF’S FORECLOSURE ACTION WAS DISCONTINUED BY STIPULATION, THE FORECLOSURE COMPLAINT COULD BE AMENDED TO SEEK RECOVERY ON THE NOTE (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the plaintiff, after its foreclosure action was discontinued, could amend the foreclosure complaint to seek recovery on the note:

“‘RPAPL 1301(3) . . . prohibits a party from commencing an action at law to recover any part of the mortgage debt while the foreclosure proceeding is pending or has not reached final judgment, without leave of the court in which the foreclosure action was brought'” ( … see RPAPL 1301[3]). Conversely, “‘where a foreclosure action is no longer pending and did not result in a judgment in the plaintiff’s favor, the plaintiff is not precluded from commencing a separate action without leave of the court'” … .

Here, pursuant to the so-ordered stipulation and the plaintiff’s release of the mortgage, the cause of action to foreclose the mortgage was, in effect, discontinued, without the entry of any judgment in the plaintiff’s favor … . Since the cause of action to foreclose the mortgage was no longer pending, the plaintiff was not precluded from seeking to recover on the note by RPAPL 1301(3), “‘a statute which must be strictly construed'” … .

Furthermore, “there is no reason the plaintiff could not seek such relief by seeking leave to amend its complaint, rather than by commencing a new action” … . Stewart Tit. Ins. Co. v Zaltsman, 2022 NY Slip Op 05107, Second Dept 8-31-22

Practice Point: Here the foreclosure action was discontinued and plaintiff was allowed to amend the foreclosure complaint to seek recovery on the note.

 

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