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PLAINTIFF NEED NOT BE ENGAGED IN CONSTRUCTION WORK TO BRING A LABOR LAW 200 CAUSE OF ACTION ALLEGING INJURY CAUSED BY A DANGEROUS CONDTION.

The Second Department determined plaintiff’s Labor Law 200 cause of action should not have been dismissed. Plaintiff was working for a mover, moving items out of a basement when he fell into a hole which had been dug for soil samples in anticipation of construction. Labor Law 200 was applicable, even though plaintiff was not engaged in construction work:

Where, as here, “a plaintiff’s injuries stem not from the manner in which the work was being performed, but, rather, from a dangerous condition on the premises, a general contractor may be liable in common-law negligence and under Labor Law § 200 only if it had control over the work site and either created the dangerous condition or had actual or constructive notice of it” … . [The general contractor] failed to establish, prima facie, that it did not have control over the work site, or that it did not create or have actual or constructive notice of the alleged dangerous condition … . Rocha v GRT Constr. of N.Y., 2016 NY Slip Op 08555, 2nd Dept 12-21-16

LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW (PLAINTIFF NEED NOT BE ENGAGED IN CONSTRUCTION WORK TO BRING A LABOR LAW 200 CAUSE OF ACTION ALLEGING INJURY CAUSED BY A DANGEROUS CONDTION)/DANGEROUS CONDITION (LABOR LAW 200, PLAINTIFF NEED NOT BE ENGAGED IN CONSTRUCTION WORK TO BRING A LABOR LAW 200 CAUSE OF ACTION ALLEGING INJURY CAUSED BY A DANGEROUS CONDTION)

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INJURY NOT GRAVITY-RELATED, LABOR LAW 240(1) CAUSE OF ACTION PROPERLY DISMI... UNDER THE FACTS, THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY REFUSED TO INSTRUCT THE JURY TO CONSIDER...