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QUESTIONS OF FACT WHETHER PAYMENT WAS PURSUANT TO AN ORAL CONTRACT, THEREBY TAKING THE CONTRACT OUT OF THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined there was a question of fact whether a payment was made on an oral contract, thereby taking the contract out of the statute of frauds. The written contract (Assignment of Units) mentioned only a transfer of ownership of Emerson Associates. But there was a question of fact whether the payment was actually made pursuant to an oral contract to transfer ownership of Emerson Partners:​

[Defendant] raised triable issues of fact as to whether [plaintiffs] orally agreed to transfer their ownership interests in Emerson Partners and whether … such an agreement was not invalid under the statute of frauds because … the payments of $230,000 … constituted partial performance unequivocally referable to the oral agreement … . … [T]here was no evidence demonstrating that the alleged oral agreement had ” absolutely no possibility in fact and law'” of being performed within a year … . Meagher v Doscher, 2018 NY Slip Op 00420, Second Dept 1-24-18

CONTRACT LAW (ORAL CONTRACT, STATUTE OF FRAUDS, QUESTIONS OF FACT WHETHER PAYMENT WAS PURSUANT TO AN ORAL CONTRACT, THEREBY TAKING THE CONTRACT OUT OF THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS (SECOND DEPT))/ORAL CONTRACT (STATUTE OF FRAUDS, QUESTIONS OF FACT WHETHER PAYMENT WAS PURSUANT TO AN ORAL CONTRACT, THEREBY TAKING THE CONTRACT OUT OF THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS (SECOND DEPT))/STATUTE OF FRAUDS (ORAL CONTRACT,  QUESTIONS OF FACT WHETHER PAYMENT WAS PURSUANT TO AN ORAL CONTRACT, THEREBY TAKING THE CONTRACT OUT OF THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS (SECOND DEPT))

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