You are here: / / QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER LANDLORD LIABLE FOR BITE BY TENANT’S DO...
,

QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER LANDLORD LIABLE FOR BITE BY TENANT’S DOG.

The Second Department determined Supreme Court properly denied the landlord’s (appellant’s) motion for summary judgment in this dog bite case. The plaintiff was bitten by a tenant’s dog. The court explained the relevant law:

… [To] “recover against a landlord for injuries caused by a tenant’s dog on a theory of strict liability, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the landlord: (1) had notice that a dog was being harbored on the premises; (2) knew or should have known that the dog had vicious propensities, and (3) had sufficient control of the premises to allow the landlord to remove or confine the dog'” … .

… [T]he appellant established his prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law dismissing the third cause of action insofar as asserted against him … . In support of his motion, he submitted, inter alia, his deposition transcript and the deposition transcripts of the injured plaintiff and [the tenant]. This evidence demonstrated, prima facie, that the appellant was not aware, nor should have been aware, that the dog had any vicious propensities … . In opposition, however, the plaintiffs raised triable issues of fact as to whether the dog did indeed have vicious propensities and whether the appellant knew or should have known of them … . Kim v Hong, 2016 NY Slip Op 06698, 2nd Dept 10-12-16

ANIMAL LAW (QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER LANDLORD LIABLE FOR BITE BY TENANT’S DOG)/LANDLORD-TENANT (DOG BITE, QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER LANDLORD LIABLE FOR BITE BY TENANT’S DOG)/DOG BITE (QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER LANDLORD LIABLE FOR BITE BY TENANT’S DOG)

You might also like
BED OF A PICKUP TRUCK IS A PROPER PLATFORM WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE INDUSTRIAL CODE, PLAINTIFF’S RIDING ON THE BED OF THE PICKUP WHILE DOING DEMOLITION WORK, THEREFORE, DID NOT VIOLATE THE INDUSTRIAL CODE.
PLAINTIFF UNABLE TO IDENTIFY THE CAUSE OF HIS FALL, DEFENDANT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED SUMMARY JUDGMENT.
DEFENDANT, WHO WAS CHARGED WITH POSSESSION OF A WEAPON, SHOULD HAVE BEEN ALLOWED TO CROSS-EXAMINE THE ARRESTING OFFICER ABOUT A CIVIL LAWSUIT WHICH ALLEGED THE OFFICER FABRICATED A WEAPONS CHARGE.
DEFENDANT DID NOT DEMONSTRATE DISCOVERY WOULD LEAD TO EVIDENCE ESSENTIAL TO DEFEND AGAINST PLAINTIFF’S SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION IN THIS INTERSECTION TRAFFIC ACCIDENT CASE; PLAINTIFF’S MOTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DENIED AS PREMATURE (SECOND DEPT). ​
SUPREME COURT PROPERLY GRANTED DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO SET ASIDE THE VERDICT IN THIS PERSONAL INJURY ACTION UNLESS PLAINTIFF STIPULATED TO A SUBSTANTIAL REDUCTION IN DAMAGES FOR PAST AND FUTURE PAIN AND SUFFERING (SECOND DEPT).
ALTHOUGH THE BACKHOE WHICH COLLIDED WITH PLAINTIFF’S VEHICLE HAD BEEN USED FOR ROADWORK THAT DAY, AT THE TIME OF THE ACCIDENT THE BACKHOE WAS BEING USED TO TRANSPORT GRAVEL TO THE WORK SITE; THE SECOND DEPARTMENT DETERMINED THE BACKHOE WAS NOT “ACTIVELY ENGAGED” IN ROADWORK AT THE TIME OF THE ACCIDENT AND, THEREFORE, THE HIGHER “RECKLESS DISREGARD” STANDARD FOR LIABILITY IN THE VEHICLE AND TRAFFIC LAW DID NOT APPLY (SECOND DEPT).
THE VIRGINIA DIVORCE DID NOT CHANGE THE PARTIES’ STATUS FROM TENANTS BY THE ENTIRETY TO TENANTS IN COMMON FOR THEIR NEW YORK MARITAL RESIDENCE; NEW YORK FOLLOWS THE “DIVISIBLE DIVORCE” DOCTRINE (SECOND DEPT).
QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER THE SALES COUNTER AND DISPLAY UNIT INSTALLED AT THE OUTSET OF THE LEASE WAS A TRADE FIXTURE WHICH COULD BE REMOVED BY THE TENANT OR A PERMANENT FIXTURE WHICH COULD NOT BE REMOVED (SECOND DEPT).

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

DOCTRINE OF EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL APPLIED TO DENY NYC TRANSIT AUTHORITY’S... PENNSYLVANIA BURGLARY CONVICTION CANNOT SERVE AS A PREDICATE FELONY IN NEW ...