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LAW OFFICE FAILURE WAS AN ADEQUATE EXCUSE FOR A TWO-WEEK DELAY IN FILING PAPERS OPPOSING SUMMARY JUDGMENT, SUPREME COURT REVERSED (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined law office failure was an adequate excuse for failing to timely response to summary judgment motions:

We disagree with the motion court that plaintiff failed to demonstrate both a reasonable excuse for her default and a meritorious cause of action … . We find that the law office failure that resulted in plaintiff’s two-week delay in filing opposition to defendants’ motions was not willful and that a meritorious cause of action as to both incidents has been set forth … . Knight v Acacia Network, Inc., 2019 NY Slip Op 08365. First Dept 11-19-19

 

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