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PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS REAR-END TRAFFIC ACCIDENT CASE SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED; THE ABSENCE OF COMPARATIVE FAULT NO LONGER NEED BE SHOWN (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment in this rear-end collision case should have been granted, noting that a plaintiff need not demonstrate the absence of comparative fault:

A plaintiff is no longer required to show freedom from comparative fault to establish her or his prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law on the issue of liability … . ” A driver of a vehicle approaching another vehicle from the rear is required to maintain a reasonably safe distance and rate of speed under the prevailing conditions to avoid colliding with the other vehicle'” ( … see Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1129[a]). A rear-end collision with a stopped or stopping vehicle establishes a prima facie case of negligence on the part of the operator of the rear vehicle, thereby requiring that operator to rebut the inference of negligence by providing a nonnegligent explanation for the collision … . Although a sudden stop of the lead vehicle may constitute a nonnegligent explanation for a rear-end collision, ” vehicle stops which are foreseeable under the prevailing traffic conditions, even if sudden and frequent, must be anticipated by the driver who follows'” … .

Here, the plaintiff testified at his deposition that he was reducing the speed of his vehicle, with his foot on the brake pedal, when his vehicle was struck in the rear by the defendant’s vehicle. Likewise, the defendant’s testimony at her deposition, a transcript of which was submitted by the plaintiff in support of his cross motion, was to the effect that her vehicle hit the plaintiff’s vehicle in the rear while in “stop and go” traffic. Thus, the plaintiff established, prima facie, that the defendant’s negligence was a proximate cause of the accident … . Xin Fang Xia v Saft, 2019 NY Slip Op 08248, Second Dept 11-13-19

 

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