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Black Letter Law Re: Rear-End Collisions and Premature Summary Judgment Motions Explained

In affirming the grant of summary judgment to the plaintiff in a rear-end collision case, the Second Department provided the black letter law on rear-end collisions and on whether a summary judgment motion is premature:

When the driver of an automobile approaches another automobile from the rear, he or she is bound to maintain a reasonably safe rate of speed and control over his or her vehicle, and to exercise reasonable care to avoid colliding with the other vehicle … . Drivers have a duty to see what should be seen and to exercise reasonable care under the circumstances to avoid an accident … . “A rear-end collision with a stopped or stopping vehicle creates a prima facie case of negligence against the operator of the rear vehicle, thereby requiring that operator to rebut the inference of negligence by providing a nonnegligent explanation for the collision” … . * * *

CPLR 3212(f) provides, in relevant part, that a court may deny a motion for summary judgment “[s]hould it appear from affidavits submitted in opposition to the motion that facts essential to justify opposition may exist but cannot then be stated” (CPLR 3212[f]…). ” This is especially so where the opposing party has not had a reasonable opportunity for disclosure prior to the making of the motion’ ” … . A party who contends that a summary judgment motion is premature is required to demonstrate that discovery might lead to relevant evidence or that the facts essential to justify opposition to the motion were exclusively within the knowledge and control of the movant (see CPLR 3212[f]…). “The mere hope or speculation that evidence sufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment may be uncovered during the discovery process is insufficient to deny the motion” … . Singh v Avis Rent A Car Sys Inc, 2014 NY Slip Op 05320, 2nd Dept 7-16-14

 

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