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THERE IS A QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER PLAINTIFF’S WORK CONSTITUTED ‘ALTERING’ WITHIN THE MEANING OF LABOR LAW 241 (6); ACTION AGAINST OUT-OF-POSSESSION LANDLORD PROPERLY DISMISSED, NO SUPERVISORY CONTROL OF THE WORK (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the defendant’s motion for summary judgment should not have been granted in this Labor Law 241 (6) action. But action against the out-of–possession landlord was properly dismissed because the landlord did not exercise and supervisory control over the work:

Plaintiff alleges that he was injured while installing a refrigeration condenser unit at premises owned by Boss and leased by Antillana. We find that the motion court improperly granted Antillana’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the Labor Law § 241(6) claim. Plaintiff was engaged in an activity within the purview of Labor Law § 241(6). Plaintiff worked at the subject premises during the build-out installing three refrigeration system condensers, which weighed about 3000 pounds and had to be moved with a forklift. Three weeks after the store was opened, plaintiff was asked to install an additional condenser which weighed about 200 pounds. The president of Antillana acknowledged that there had been a renovation project underway at the premises before plaintiff’s accident.

We find that there is an issue of fact whether the subsequent installation of the condenser constituted an “alteration” of the premises, which falls within the ambit of “construction” work under Labor Law § 241(6) … .

We also find triable issues of material fact as to whether Antillana violated 12 NYCRR 23-1.25(d), (e)(1), (e)(3), and (f), relied upon by plaintiff to support his Labor Law § 241(6) claim. Rodriguez v Antillana & Metro Supermarket Corp., 2019 NY Slip Op 07714, First Dept 10-29-19

 

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