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DOWNWARD DEPARTURE FROM LEVEL TWO TO LEVEL ONE WAS APPROPRIATE; DEFENDANT PARTICIPATED IN THE SEX TRAFFICKING CONSPIRACY WHILE SHE HERSELF WAS A VICTIM OF SEX TRAFFICKING (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, lowering defendant’s risk assessment from a lever two to level one, determined that defendant was herself a victim of sex trafficking and her participation in the conspiracy occurred at the same time that she was being exploited:

… [T]he circumstances identified and proven by the defendant … are not accounted for by the SORA Guidelines and tend to demonstrate a lower likelihood of reoffense and danger to the community. The defendant’s evidence showed that she was exploited by the commercial sex industry when she was a minor, and that, while she later took on some “management” responsibilities by “training” other girls, answering phones, and making appointments, at the same time, she continued to be exploited by that industry as she simultaneously served as a sex worker. There was no evidence or indication that the defendant recruited the identified victim, or any victims, or that she engaged in any acts or conduct to coerce the victim, or any victims, to engage in prostitution … . Indeed, the defendant’s level of responsibility in the sex trafficking conspiracy can be gauged by the federal sentencing court’s decision to sentence the defendant to time served.

Finally, under these circumstances, we find that a departure to a level one risk designation is warranted as a matter of discretion “to avoid an [overassessment] of the defendant’s dangerousness and risk of sexual recidivism” … . People v Snyder, 2019 NY Slip Op 06521, Second Dept 9-11-19

 

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QUESTIONS OF FACT PRECLUDED SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON MOST (BUT NOT ALL) OF THE CAUSES... PLAINTIFF DID NOT DEMONSTRATE COMPLIANCE WITH THE NOTICE OF DEFAULT PROVISION...