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DEFENSE COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE FOR FAILING TO MOVE TO SUPPRESS TANGIBLE EVIDENCE SEIZED PURSUANT TO A SEARCH WARRANT WHICH WAS ISSUED BASED UPON UNWARNED STATEMENTS MADE BY DEFENDANT, STATEMENTS WHICH HAD BEEN SUPPRESSED BY THE TRIAL COURT (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing defendant’s conviction and ordering new suppression motions and a new trial, determined defense counsel was ineffective for failing to move to suppress tangible evidence seized pursuant to a search warrant which was issued based upon unwarned statements made by the defendant, statements which had been suppressed by the trial court:

Here, defense counsel’s assertion of an inappropriate argument in support of the belated suppression motion, and counsel’s complete failure to challenge the admissibility of physical evidence seized from the defendant’s home based on the Miranda violation … , prejudiced the defendant and rendered counsel’s representation ineffective … . People v Corchado, 2019 NY Slip Op 06408, Second Dept 8-28-19

 

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NO EVIDENCE THE FATAL ACCIDENT WAS CAUSED BY DRIVING TOO FAST FOR THE CONDITIONS;... UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS CASE, PRE-MIRANDA QUESTIONING OF THE DEFENDANT...