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SPECIFICITY REQUIRED FOR A FRAUD CAUSE OF ACTION IS TEMPERED WHEN THE DETAILS ARE EXCLUSIVELY WITHIN THE KNOWLEDGE OF THE DEFENDANT.

The Second Department, in affirming the denial of a motion to dismiss a cause of action for fraud, noted that the specificity required for a fraud complaint is tempered when the details are exclusively within the knowledge of the defendant:

A plaintiff asserting a cause of action alleging fraud is required to plead with particularity (see CPLR 3016[b]…). When, however, the operative facts are “peculiarly within the knowledge of the party” alleged to have committed the fraud, it may be impossible at the early stages of the proceeding for the plaintiff to detail all the circumstances constituting the fraud … . Thus, as the Court of Appeals has held, the pleading requirement of CPLR 3016(b) “should not be so strictly interpreted as to prevent an otherwise valid cause of action in situations where it may be impossible to state in detail the circumstances constituting a fraud'” … . Instead, the pleading requirement will be deemed to have been met “when the facts are sufficient to permit a reasonable inference of the alleged conduct” … . Bibbo v Arvanitakis, 2016 NY Slip Op 08194, 2nd Dept 12-7-16

FRAUD (SPECIFICITY REQUIRED FOR A FRAUD CAUSE OF ACTION IS TEMPERED WHEN THE DETAILS ARE EXCLUSIVELY WITHIN THE KNOWLEDGE OF THE DEFENDANT)/CIVIL PROCEDURE (MOTION TO DISMISS, FRAUD, SPECIFICITY REQUIRED FOR A FRAUD CAUSE OF ACTION IS TEMPERED WHEN THE DETAILS ARE EXCLUSIVELY WITHIN THE KNOWLEDGE OF THE DEFENDANT).DISMISS, MOTION TO (CIVIL, FRAUD, SPECIFICITY REQUIRED FOR A FRAUD CAUSE OF ACTION IS TEMPERED WHEN THE DETAILS ARE EXCLUSIVELY WITHIN THE KNOWLEDGE OF THE DEFENDANT)

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