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ALTHOUGH THE DEBT WAS INCURRED DURING MARRIAGE, WIFE WAS NOT RESPONSIBLE FOR THE PORTION OF THE DEBT USED SOLELY TO FURTHER HUSBAND’S BUSINESS.

The Second Department determined Supreme Court properly allocated payment of a home equity line of credit (HELOC) incurred during marriage, taking into account a portion of the debt was used solely to further defendant-husband’s business:

The Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in directing the defendant to pay two-thirds of the balance of a home equity line of credit (hereinafter the HELOC) or $198,667, and that the plaintiff was to be responsible for one-third of the balance of the HELOC or $99,330. In general, “[e]xpenses incurred prior to the commencement of a divorce action constitute marital debt and should be equally shared by the parties” … . However, a financial obligation incurred by one party in pursuit of his or her separate interests should remain that party’s separate liability … . Under the circumstances of this case, inasmuch as the evidence established that the HELOC debt was incurred for the dual purpose of improving the marital residence and paying bills as well as funding the defendant’s separate business interest in which the plaintiff had no share, the defendant failed to show that the HELOC debt as to the defendant’s separate business interest should be shared equally. Horn v Horn, 2016 NY Slip Op 08198, 2nd Dept 12-7-16

FAMILY LAW (ALTHOUGH THE DEBT WAS INCURRED DURING MARRIAGE, WIFE WAS NOT RESPONSIBLE FOR THE PORTION OF THE DEBT USED SOLELY TO FURTHER HUSBAND’S BUSINESS)/MARITAL PROPERTY (ALTHOUGH THE DEBT WAS INCURRED DURING MARRIAGE, WIFE WAS NOT RESPONSIBLE FOR THE PORTION OF THE DEBT USED SOLELY TO FURTHER HUSBAND’S BUSINESS)

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