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WAIVER OF APPEAL INVALID; ALREADY COMPLETED SENTENCE REDUCED BECAUSE OF THE IMMIGRATION CONSEQUENCES OF THE ORIGINAL SENTENCE; MATTER CONSIDERED ON APPEAL IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reducing the defendant’s already completed sentence in the interest of justice, determined the waiver of appeal was invalid and the immigration consequences of defendant’s sentence warranted a reduction to 364 days:

Given the defendant’s age of 20 years, that he had dropped out of high school in the 11th grade, that he had documented mental health issues, and his limited experience in the criminal justice system, the Supreme Court’s terse colloquy regarding the appeal waiver was insufficient  … . A written appeal waiver, such as the one signed by the defendant, is “not a complete substitute for an on-the-record explanation of the nature of the right to appeal” … . It is not “sufficient for the trial court to defer to the defendant’s off-the-record conversations with defense counsel by merely confirming with defense counsel that he or she has discussed the waiver of the right to appeal with the defendant” … . Thus, the appeal waiver does not preclude review of the defendant’s excessive sentence claim.

Although the defendant has served his respective sentences, the question of whether the sentences imposed should be reduced is not academic, because those sentences may have potential immigration consequences … .

Considering all of the relevant circumstances of this case, including the potential immigration consequences to the defendant, his sentences should be reduced to concurrent definite terms of imprisonment of 364 days … . People v Bakayoko, 2019 NY Slip Op 05677, Second Dept 7-17-19

 

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