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THE TOLLING PROVISION, WHICH TOLLS THE FIVE-YEAR STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS FOR CERTAIN SEXUAL OFFENSES UNTIL THE VICTIM TURNS 18, WAS PROPERLY APPLIED TO RENDER THE INDICTMENT TIMELY; THERE IS NO CONFLICT BETWEEN THE TOLLING PROVISION AND THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Rivera, with a two-judge concurrence, determined that the tolling provision, which tolls the five-year statute of limitations for certain sexual offenses involving a child until the child turns 18, applied here and the indictment, brought when the victim was 21, was timely. The opinion delves into an extensive statutory-interpretation analysis which is too detailed to fairly summarize here:

Defendant claims his prosecution is time-barred because the applicable five-year limitations period set forth in CPL former 30.10 (3)(e) expired before the filing of the felony complaint, and the statute of limitations is not subject to tolling under CPL 30.10 (3)(f). Defendant’s argument is unpersuasive, misconstrues the statutory provisions, and ignores the relevant legislative history. The crime for which defendant stands convicted is expressly encompassed by CPL 30.10 (3)(f), and involves the type of conduct the legislature sought to address by expansive, albeit delayed, prosecution of multiple acts of sexual abuse against a minor. * * *

Unlike CPL 30.10 (3)(e), which is a self-contained statute of limitations, CPL 30.10 (3)(f) is a tolling provision and as such is dependent on reference to time limits found elsewhere in the statute. Defendant mistakenly equates the two subsections — as if they are both statutes of limitations — when he claims they are in conflict and the specific provision of CPL 30.10 (3)(e) overrides the general provision of CPL 30.10 (3)(f). The more apt comparison is to the two statutes of limitations CPL 30.10 (3)(e) and 30.10 (2)(b), which harmoniously coexist as a specific and general statute of limitations, respectively, and which in no way lead to the conclusion promoted by defendant, that CPL 30.10 (3)(e) is superfluous. Regardless, there is no conflict obvious from the interplay of subsections (3)(e) and (3)(f). One sets forth a five-year prosecution deadline and the other explains when the clock begins to run on that deadline. People v Pabon, 2016 NY Slip Op 07108, CtApp 11-1-16

 

CRIMINAL LAW (THE TOLLING PROVISION, WHICH TOLLS THE FIVE-YEAR STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS FOR CERTAIN SEXUAL OFFENSES UNTIL THE VICTIM TURNS 18, WAS PROPERLY APPLIED TO RENDER THE INDICTMENT TIMELY; THERE IS NO CONFLICT BETWEEN THE TOLLING PROVISION AND THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS)/STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS (CRIMINAL LAW, THE TOLLING PROVISION, WHICH TOLLS THE FIVE-YEAR STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS FOR CERTAIN SEXUAL OFFENSES UNTIL THE VICTIM TURNS 18, WAS PROPERLY APPLIED TO RENDER THE INDICTMENT TIMELY; THERE IS NO CONFLICT BETWEEN THE TOLLING PROVISION AND THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS)TOLLING PROVISION (STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS, CRIMINAL LAW, (THE TOLLING PROVISION, WHICH TOLLS THE FIVE-YEAR STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS FOR CERTAIN SEXUAL OFFENSES UNTIL THE VICTIM TURNS 18, WAS PROPERLY APPLIED TO RENDER THE INDICTMENT TIMELY; THERE IS NO CONFLICT BETWEEN THE TOLLING PROVISION AND THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS)/CHILDREN, SEX OFFENSES INVOLVING  (THE TOLLING PROVISION, WHICH TOLLS THE FIVE-YEAR STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS FOR CERTAIN SEXUAL OFFENSES UNTIL THE VICTIM TURNS 18, WAS PROPERLY APPLIED TO RENDER THE INDICTMENT TIMELY; THERE IS NO CONFLICT BETWEEN THE TOLLING PROVISION AND THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS)

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