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UNDER THE MULTIPLE DWELLING LAW, LESSEE WAS NOT ENTITLED TO RENT FROM THE SUBTENANTS FOR THE PERIOD DURING WHICH THERE WAS NO CERTIFICATE OF OCCUPANCY (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined that the subtenants (respondents), pursuant to the Multiple Dwelling Law, could not collect rent from the lessee (petitioner) for the period during which there was no certificate of occupancy:

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Petitioner was the net lessee of the third floor of a six-story building, a de facto multiple dwelling; the net lease provided, inter alia, that there was no permanent certificate of occupancy for either the building or the demised premises. In April 2013, petitioner brought this proceeding alleging that respondents, its subtenants, had failed to pay residential use and occupancy since January 2013. Affording the relevant statutory language its natural and ordinary meaning … , we conclude that the proceeding must be dismissed because petitioner was not entitled to collect rent from respondents.

For purposes of the Multiple Dwelling Law, an “owner” is broadly defined to include a “lessee” … . Respondents’ unit constituted a “dwelling” under the Multiple Dwelling Law [“any building or structure or portion thereof which is occupied in whole or in part as the home, residence or sleeping place of one or more human beings” (Multiple Dwelling Law 4[4]). The owner of a “dwelling or structure … occupied in whole or in part for human habitation in violation of [§ 301]” may not recover rent for the period during which there is no certificate of occupancy for “such premises” (Multiple Dwelling Law § 302[1][b]). Nor may the owner maintain an action or special proceeding for possession of the premises for nonpayment of “such rent” (id.). Thus, petitioner, as owner of respondents’ dwelling, was precluded from charging respondents rent or other remuneration while the building lacked a certificate of occupancy for residential use … . Matter of 49 Bleecker, Inc. v Gathien, 2018 NY Slip Op 00476, First Dept 1-25-18

LANDLORD-TENANT (UNDER THE MULTIPLE DWELLING LAW, LESSEE WAS NOT ENTITLED TO RENT FROM THE SUBTENANTS FOR THE PERIOD DURING WHICH THERE WAS NO CERTIFICATE OF OCCUPANCY (FIRST DEPT))/MULTIPLE DWELLING LAW (LANDLORD-TENANT, UNDER THE MULTIPLE DWELLING LAW, LESSEE WAS NOT ENTITLED TO RENT FROM THE SUBTENANTS FOR THE PERIOD DURING WHICH THERE WAS NO CERTIFICATE OF OCCUPANCY (FIRST DEPT))/CERTIFICATE OF OCCUPANCY (LANDLORD-TENANT, MULTIPLE DWELLING LAW,  LESSEE WAS NOT ENTITLED TO RENT FROM THE SUBTENANTS FOR THE PERIOD DURING WHICH THERE WAS NO CERTIFICATE OF OCCUPANCY (FIRST DEPT))/SUBTENANTS (UNDER THE MULTIPLE DWELLING LAW, LESSEE WAS NOT ENTITLED TO RENT FROM THE SUBTENANTS FOR THE PERIOD DURING WHICH THERE WAS NO CERTIFICATE OF OCCUPANCY (FIRST DEPT))

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