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SUPREME COURT SHOULD HAVE SUMMONED A NECESSARY PARTY WHICH WAS SUBJECT TO THE JURISDICTION OF THE COURT PURSUANT TO CPLR 1001; SUPREME COURT SHOULD HAVE GRANTED PLAINTIFF’S SECOND MOTION FOR AN EXTENSION OF TIME TO SERVE A DEFENDANT IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE, DESPITE THE EXPIRATION OF THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS AND LAW-OFFICE-FAILURE EXCUSE (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff bank’s second motion to extend the time to serve defendant (Bandolos). after the statute of limitations had run, should have been granted. The court further held that Supreme Court should have summoned a necessary party (Mother of Pearl, the record owner) because the party was subject to the court’s jurisdiction:

The Supreme Court should have granted that branch of the plaintiff’s motion which was, in effect, for leave to join Mother of Pearl as a party to the action … . “A party may move for judgment dismissing one or more causes of action asserted against him [or her] on the ground that . . . the court should not proceed in the absence of a person who should be a party” (CPLR 3211[a][10]). However, CPLR 1001(b) provides that where the party “is subject to the jurisdiction of the court, the court shall order him [or her] summoned.” Mother of Pearl, as the record owner of the property, is a necessary party to this action (see CPLR 1001[a]; RPAPL 1311[1]) subject to the jurisdiction of the court. Consequently, the court should have ordered Mother of Pearl summoned, rather than granting that branch of the mortgagors’ cross motion which was pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(10) to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against them … . …

Further, under the circumstances of this case, the Supreme Court should have granted that branch of the plaintiff’s motion which was pursuant to CPLR 306-b for leave to extend the time to serve the summons and complaint upon Kelly Bandalos by publication in the interest of justice … . While the action was timely commenced, the statute of limitations has since expired. Although the plaintiff’s only excuse for not serving Kelly Bandalos by publication is law office failure, it did make diligent efforts to serve her prior to the first extension of time to serve and the issuance of the order of publication. Further, Kelly Bandalos had actual notice of the action within 120 days of its commencement, she served and filed an answer, and there is no identifiable prejudice to her attributable to the delay in service … .  Deutsche Bank Natl. Trust Co. v Bandalos, 2019 NY Slip Op 05106, Second Dept 6-26-19

 

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