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DESIGNATING PETITION PROPERLY INVALIDATED AND THE CANDIDATE’S NAME WAS PROPERLY STRUCK FROM THE PRIMARY BALLOT, THE CANDIDATE’S NAME APPEARED ON DESIGNATING PETITIONS FOR TWO DIFFERENT PUBLIC OFFICES WHICH PRESUMPTIVELY MISLED THE PUBLIC (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined the designating petition was properly invalidated and the candidate’s name (Duffy) was properly removed from the primary ballot. The Second Department noted that the failure to include the index number on the order to show cause and the petition was a mistake which could be disregarded. The index number was on the request for judicial intervention which was served with the order to show cause and petition (CPLR 2001). The Second Department further noted that the petition met the strict pleading requirements for fraud by by virtue of the incorporation of another document (objections) by reference (CPLR 3016 (b) and 3014).:

… [T]he Supreme Court granted the petition to invalidate the petition designating Duffy as a candidate for Council Member and directed that Duffy’s name be removed from the primary ballot. The court found that Duffy and her agents did not intentionally seek to mislead enrolled party voters while gathering designating petition signatures, but that Duffy nevertheless knew that her name appeared simultaneously on two separate designating petitions for two different public offices, which presumptively misled enrolled voters as to which of the two public offices she was truly seeking. The court found that Duffy “failed to rebut this presumption by public action and/or filings in such a manner as to prevent election fraud.” * * *

… [T]he voters were misled, warranting the invalidation of the designating petition for Council Member. In circulating the designating petition for that office, Duffy deleted from the committee’s designating petition the name of a candidate who had been endorsed by the committee, substituted her name for the name of that candidate, and circulated the revised designating petition without the permission of Bouvier, whose name continued to appear on the designating petition. The designating petition, as altered and circulated, was “misleading in suggesting that the various candidates listed intended to run together” as a team … . While a single instance of adding another candidate’s name without consent, standing alone, has been found insufficient to warrant the invalidation of an entire designating petition … , this case involves much more than the mere addition of a name to a designating petition. Here, Duffy affirmatively altered an existing designating petition containing other names by substituting her own name in place of the name of a candidate who had been endorsed by the committee. Moreover, under the circumstances of this case, the problem of misleading voters was compounded by the simultaneous circulation of two designating petitions designating Duffy for two separate public offices … . Matter of Lynch v Duffy, 2019 NY Slip Op 04168, Second Dept 5-29-19

 

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