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EVEN THOUGH THE PRESUMPTION OF LEGITIMACY WAS NOT REBUTTED WITH RESPECT TO MOTHER’S HUSBAND IN THIS PATERNITY PROCEEDING, FAMILY COURT SHOULD HAVE APPLIED THE DOCTRINE OF EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL UNDER A ‘BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD’ ANALYSIS TO ADJUDICATE THE RESPONDENT, WITH WHOM A CHILD-PARENT BOND HAD DEVELOPED, THE FATHER (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Family Court, determined the doctrine of equitable estoppel should have been invoked by Family Court in this paternity proceeding to find it was in the best interests of the child to adjudicate the respondent, Ricardo R. E., father of the child. The petitioner-mother was married to Jorge E. T. at the time the child was conceived and born. Family Court relied on the presumption of legitimacy to adjudicate Jorge E. T. the father. The Second Department agreed with Family Court’s finding that the presumption of legitimacy was not rebutted:

Even if the presumption of legitimacy applies, the Family Court must proceed to an analysis of the best interests of the child before deciding whether to order a test … . To that end, the “paramount concern” in a proceeding to establish paternity is the best interests of the child, and the Family Court should hold a hearing addressed to that determination … . Importantly, biology is not dispositive in a court’s paternity determination … . …

… [W]e agree with the Family Court that the petitioner failed to rebut the presumption of legitimacy by clear and convincing evidence … . Nevertheless, regardless of the applicability of the presumption of legitimacy, the Family Court should not have refused to consider the issue of equitable estoppel raised by the petitioner and Ricardo R. E. in response to the husband’s assertion of paternity … . As relevant here, the doctrine “is a defense in a paternity proceeding which, among other applications, precludes a man from asserting his paternity when he acquiesced in the establishment of a strong parent-child bond between the child and another man” (… see … Family Ct Act § 522). It is significant that “courts impose equitable estoppel to protect the status interests of a child in an already recognized and operative parent-child relationship” … . While this doctrine is invoked in a variety of situations, “whether it is being used in the offensive posture to enforce rights or the defensive posture to prevent rights from being enforced, [it] is only to be used to protect the best interests of the child” … . For that reason, this dispute does not involve the equities between or among the adults. The case turns exclusively on the best interests of the child … . Matter of Onorina C.T. v Ricardo R.E., 2019 NY Slip Op 03345, Second Dept 5-1-19

 

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