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FAILURE TO TELL THE JURY TO STOP DELIBERATING IF THEY FIND THE JUSTIFICATION DEFENSE APPLIES REQUIRED REVERSAL, EVEN THOUGH THE JUDGE TOLD THE JURY TO ACQUIT ON ALL COUNTS IF THE JUSTIFICATION DEFENSE APPLIES (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing defendant’s conviction, over a dissent, determined the judge’s jury instruction did not make it clear that finding the defendant not guilty of assault first based upon the justification defense required that the jury stop deliberating. The judge had told the jury they must find the defendant not guilty “on all counts” if the justification defense applies:

… [R]eversal is warranted despite the lack of preservation, because, contrary to our dissenting colleague’s contention, the court’s charge, as a whole, failed to properly instruct the jury that if it found defendant not guilty of first-degree assault based on a finding of justification, the jury must not consider the lesser second-degree assault counts arising from defendant’s use of force. The dissent posits that the instruction here is meaningfully different from Velez [People v Velez (131 AD3d 129)] in that the court “made it clear that a finding of not guilty on the basis of justification of the greater charge of assault in the first degree necessitated an acquittal on all counts.” However, we have already considered and rejected the specific argument that it is proper or meaningfully different from Velez where a court employs the same language that the jury “must find the defendant not guilty on all counts” if it finds justification on the greater charge … . This language is not sufficient to convey to the jury the “stop deliberations” principle … . People v Wah, 2019 NY Slip Op 02973, First Dept 4-23-19

 

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VALID EVIDENTIARY ISSUES WERE NOTICED BY APPELLATE COUNSEL BUT WERE NOT ADDRESSED... DEFENDANT AND DEFENSE COUNSEL ENTITLED TO NOTICE AND AN OPPORTUNITY TO BE HEARD...