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IN THIS FORECLOSURE ACTION THE MORTGAGE COMPANY DID NOT DEMONSTRATE STANDING WITH PROOF MEETING THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE BUSINESS RECORDS EXCEPTION TO THE HEARSAY RULE (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff mortgage company did not demonstrate standing with proof meeting the requirements of the business records exception to the hearsay rule:

In support of its motion, the plaintiff submitted the affidavit of Melissa Black, an employee of the plaintiff’s loan servicer, who alleged, based upon a review of business records maintained by the loan servicer, that the plaintiff had been “in continuous possession of the note and mortgage since June 26, 2007.” However, because Black did not attest that she was personally familiar with the plaintiff’s record-keeping practices and procedures, the plaintiff failed to demonstrate that the records relied upon by Black were admissible under the business records exception to the hearsay rule (see CPLR 4518[a] … ). In any event, the submissions by the plaintiff of different copies of the note raise a triable issue of fact, inter alia, as to whether the note was assigned to the plaintiff prior to the commencement of the action … . EMC Mtge. Corp. v Tinari, 2019 NY Slip Op 01392, Second Dept 2-27-19

 

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