You are here: / / SCHOOL-GROUNDS RESTRICTION APPLIES ONLY TO OFFENDERS SERVING A SENTENCE...
,

SCHOOL-GROUNDS RESTRICTION APPLIES ONLY TO OFFENDERS SERVING A SENTENCE FOR ONE OF THE OFFENSES ENUMERATED IN THE EXECUTIVE LAW AT THE TIME OF RELEASE, SINCE PETITIONER, WHO WAS A LEVEL THREE SEX OFFENDER, WAS SERVING A SENTENCE FOR BURGLARY AT THE TIME OF RELEASE, THE SCHOOL-GROUNDS RESTRICTION DID NOT APPLY TO HIM (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Aarons, disagreeing with the 4th Department, determined that the restriction in the Executive Law prohibiting a sex offender from living within 1000 feet of a school only applied if the sentence being served at the time of release on parole is for one of the offenses enumerated in the statute. Defendant had previously been convicted of a sex offense and had been adjudicated a level three sex offender. But the offense for which he was incarcerated at the time of his release (burglary) is not an enumerated offense:

… [T]he statute is unambiguous and interpret it in the manner advanced by him. In this regard, we read “such person” as plainly and unequivocally referring to “a person serving a sentence for an offense defined in [Penal Law articles 130, 135 or 263 or Penal Law § 255.25, § 255.26 or 255.27]” (Executive Law § 259-c [14]). We are unpersuaded by respondent’s contention that “such person” in Executive Law § 259-c (14) can be rationally read to refer only to “a person” or “a person serving a sentence” as stated in the beginning of the statute and without regard to that part of the statute specifying various offenses. Based on the foregoing, we find that the school-grounds restriction provided in Executive Law § 259-c (14) applies either to (1) an offender serving one of the enumerated offenses whose victim was under 18 years old, or (2) an offender serving one of the enumerated offenses who was designated a risk level three sex offender. Because petitioner was not serving a sentence for an offense delineated in Executive Law § 259-c (14), the statute does not apply to him. People v Superintendent, Woodbourne Corr. Facility, 2019 NY Slip Op 01267, Third Dept 2-21-19

 

You might also like
THE EMPLOYER’S WORKERS’ COMPENSATION CARRIER WAS ENTITLED, PURSUANT TO WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAW SECTION 15(3)(W), TO TAKE CREDIT TOWARD AWARDS OF TEMPORARY DISABILITY (THIRD DEPT).
Pit Bull Acted in Self-Defense and Should Not Have Been Deemed “Dangerous;” ”Dangerous” Finding Can Not Be Based Solely On the Dog’s Breed
THE WIND BLOWING A DOOR SHUT ON PETITIONER POLICE OFFICER’S HAND DID NOT CONSTITUTE AN “ACCIDENT” WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE RETIREMENT AND SOCIAL SECURITY LAW (THIRD DEPT).
DEFENSE COUNSEL’S FAILURE TO OBJECT TO THE PROSECUTOR’S MISCHARACTERIZATION OF DNA EVIDENCE, STANDING ALONE. WARRANTED REVERSAL FOR INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE.
Motion to Intervene Should Have Been Granted—Criteria Explained
REPORTER WHO INTERVIEWED A MURDER SUSPECT WAS ENTITLED TO A WRIT OF PROHIBITION PREVENTING THE ENFORCEMENT OF A SUBPOENA TO TESTIFY AT THE SUSPECT’S TRIAL; THE PEOPLE DID NOT MEET THE CRITERIA OF CIVIL RIGHTS LAW 79-H, THE NEW YORK SHIELD LAW, WHICH PROTECTS REPORTERS FROM SUBPOENAS WHEN THE REPORTER’S TESTIMONY IS NOT “CRITICAL OR NECESSARY” TO THE PEOPLE’S CASE (THIRD DEPT).
QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER WORKER’S COMPENSATION LAW PRECLUDED SUIT IN NEGLIGENCE, DEFENDANT WAS BOTH AN OFFICER OF PLAINTIFF’S EMPLOYER AND OWNER, IN AN INDIVIDUAL CAPACITY, OF THE PREMISES WHERE PLAINTIFF SLIPPED AND FELL.
NONPUBLIC RESIDENTIAL HEALTH CARE FACILITIES NEED PERMISSION TO WITHDRAW EQUITY OR TRANSFER ASSETS IN EXCESS OF 3% OF THE FACILITIES’ REVENUE; CORPORATE OWNERS NEED NOT INCLUDE FEDERAL AND STATE INCOME TAXES IN THE 3% CALCULATION; FACILITIES OWNED BY PASS-THROUGH ENTITIES (I.E., LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES) MUST INCLUDE FEDERAL AND STATE INCOME TAXES IN THE 3% CALCULATION (THIRD DEPT).

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

PEOPLE’S FAILURE TO PROCURE ANOTHER ACCUSATORY INSTRUMENT AFTER THE COURT... RELEASE SIGNED BY PLAINTIFF’S DECEDENT IN 1997 DID NOT ENTITLE CHEVRON...