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SUPREME COURT PROPERLY RELIED ON THE RESULTS OF A FRYE HEARING IN A PRIOR TRIAL TO ALLOW THE TESTIMONY OF A DEFENSE EXPERT (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined Supreme Court properly relied upon the results of a Frye hearing involving the same expert (and judge) in a prior trial. The expert was allowed to testify plaintiff’s injuries could not have been caused by the traffic accident. There was a defense verdict:

“The long-recognized rule of Frye v United States . . . is that expert testimony based on scientific principles or procedures is admissible but only after a principle or procedure has gained general acceptance in its specified field” … . “General acceptance can be demonstrated through scientific or legal writings, judicial opinions, or expert opinions other than that of the proffered expert” … . Further, even if the proffered expert opinion is based upon accepted methods, it must satisfy “the admissibility question applied to all evidence—whether there is a proper foundation—to determine whether the accepted methods were appropriately employed in a particular case” … .

In this case, we agree with the Supreme Court’s determination to permit the expert’s testimony without first holding a hearing to determine its admissibility … . “A court need not hold a Frye hearing where[, as in the case at bar,] it can rely upon previous rulings in other court proceedings as an aid in determining the admissibility of the proffered testimony” … . Moreover, in this particular case, there was a proper foundation for the admission of the expert’s opinion. Shah v Rahman, 2018 NY Slip Op 08342, Second Dept 12-5-18

NEGLIGENCE (SUPREME COURT PROPERLY RELIED ON THE RESULTS OF A FRYE HEARING IN A PRIOR TRIAL TO ALLOW THE TESTIMONY OF A DEFENSE EXPERT (SECOND DEPT))/EVIDENCE (FRYE HEARING, SUPREME COURT PROPERLY RELIED ON THE RESULTS OF A FRYE HEARING IN A PRIOR TRIAL TO ALLOW THE TESTIMONY OF A DEFENSE EXPERT (SECOND DEPT))/EXPERT OPINION (FRYE HEARING, SUPREME COURT PROPERLY RELIED ON THE RESULTS OF A FRYE HEARING IN A PRIOR TRIAL TO ALLOW THE TESTIMONY OF A DEFENSE EXPERT (SECOND DEPT))/FRYE HEARING (SUPREME COURT PROPERLY RELIED ON THE RESULTS OF A FRYE HEARING IN A PRIOR TRIAL TO ALLOW THE TESTIMONY OF A DEFENSE EXPERT (SECOND DEPT))/CIVIL PROCEDURE (NEGLIGENCE, EVIDENCE, FRYE HEARING, SUPREME COURT PROPERLY RELIED ON THE RESULTS OF A FRYE HEARING IN A PRIOR TRIAL TO ALLOW THE TESTIMONY OF A DEFENSE EXPERT (SECOND DEPT))

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