You are here: / / ALTHOUGH THE STATE IS THE TITLE OWNER OF PIER 40 ON THE HUDSON RIVER, THE...

ALTHOUGH THE STATE IS THE TITLE OWNER OF PIER 40 ON THE HUDSON RIVER, THE HUDSON RIVER PARK ACT TRANSFERRED LABOR LAW ABSOLUTE LIABILITY TO THE HUDSON RIVER PARK TRUST.

The First Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Saxe, determined that the state, although the title owner of the property (Pier 40) where plaintiff was injured by a falling beam, was not subject to absolute liability under the Labor Law. Under the Hudson River Park Act, the day to day operation and management of Pier 40 was transferred to a public benefit corporation, the Hudson River Park Trust. The court was careful to note that leasing property does not relieve the owner of Labor Law liability. However, the terms of the Hudson River Park Act indicated the legislature's intent transfer Labor Law liability to the trust:

Section 5 of the Hudson River Park Act (Uncons Laws § 1645[1]), gives the Trust total “authority over the planning, design, construction, operation and maintenance of” the park; the Act also gives the Trust the right to receive rents and other revenues generated from the park (see §§ 1646[g], 1647[10]), although ownership and title would remain with the State (see § 1647[2], [3]). Also, notably, the Act directs that the Trust has the capacity to sue and be sued (§ 1647[1][d][v]), and requires that all tort actions commenced against the Trust comply with the notice of claim requirement of General Municipal Law § 50-e (§ 1651). Most importantly, the Act expressly states that “[u]pon the coming into existence of the trust, the trust shall succeed to all contracts, leases, licenses and other legal obligations respecting the park to which its predecessors are a party at or after the effective date of this act” (§ 1645 [1] [emphasis added]). The legislature's use of the term “succeed to” and its reference to all “other legal obligations” of its predecessors clearly reflects an intent to have the Trust take over all legal liability arising out of ownership of the Park's premises. Costa v State of New York, 2016 NY Slip Op 04119, 1st Dept 5-26-16

LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW (ALTHOUGH THE STATE IS THE TITLE OWNER OF PIER 40 ON THE HUDSON RIVER, THE HUDSON RIVER PARK ACT TRANSFERRED LABOR LAW ABSOLUTE LIABILITY TO THE HUDSON RIVER PARK TRUST)/HUDSON RIVER PARK TRUST (LABOR LAW, ALTHOUGH THE STATE IS THE TITLE OWNER OF PIER 40 ON THE HUDSON RIVER, THE HUDSON RIVER PARK ACT TRANSFERRED LABOR LAW ABSOLUTE LIABILITY TO THE HUDSON RIVER PARK TRUST)

You might also like
ACCELERATION OF A DEBT DOES NOT AFFECT THOSE INSTALLMENT PAYMENTS DUE MORE THAN SIX YEARS BEFORE THE ACTION ON THE NOTES WAS COMMENCED, ACTION ON THOSE PAYMENTS IS TIME-BARRED (FIRST DEPT).
THE MOTION TO SET ASIDE THE VERDICT APPORTIONING LIABILITY TO THE GYNECOLOGIST WHO NOTED IN HIS REPORT HE FOUND “NO ABNORMALITIES” SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED; PLAINTIFF DID NOT PROVE THE NOTATION MISLED THE PRIMARY CARE PHYICIAN RESULTING IN A DELAY IN DIAGNOSING APPENDICITIS (FIRST DEPT).
PLAINTIFF’S ACTION FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT, ALLEGING DEFENDANT-ATTORNEYS FAILED TO RETURN THE BALANCE OF THE FEE PAID AT THE CONCLUSION OF THE CASE, PROPERLY SURVIVED A MOTION TO DISMISS (FIRST DEPT).
Contract Provision Protected Contractee from Damages for Delay Caused by Regulators​
PETITIONER DEMONSTRATED AN INTELLECTUAL DISABILITY QUALIFYING HER FOR MEDICAID-REIMBURSED HOME AND COMMUNITY BASED SERVICES, CONTRARY FINDING BY THE NYS OFFICE FOR PEOPLE WITH DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES ANNULLED (FIRST DEPT).
IN THIS SCAFFOLD-FALL CASE, EVIDENCE PLAINTIFF WAS INSTRUCTED TO USE GUARD RAILS ON THE SCAFFOLD BUT DID NOT REQUIRED DENIAL OF PLAINTFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE LABOR LAW 240 (1) CAUSE OF ACTION (FIRST DEPT).
PLAINTIFF WAS STRUCK BY A STEEL BAR WHICH FELL DURING AN ATTEMPT TO HOIST IT WITH EXCAVATING EQUIPMENT; PLAINTIFF WAS ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE LABOR LAW 240(1) CAUSE OF ACTION; PLAINTIFF DID NOT NEED TO DEMONSTRATE THE EXACT CAUSE FOR THE BAR’S FALLING, NOR DID HE NEED TO SPECIFY THE EQUIPMENT WHICH SHOULD HAVE BEEN USED (FIRST DEPT). ​
INJURY FROM SIX INCH FALL OF 500 POUND BEAM COVERED BY LABOR LAW 240 (1), POWER TO STOP WORK FOR SAFETY REASONS INSUFFICIENT BASIS FOR LIABILITY UNDER LABOR LAW 200 (FIRST DEPT).

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

INSURER’S DUTY TO DEFEND MUST BE DETERMINED SOLELY UPON THE INFORMATION... MAYOR DID NOT HAVE THE AUTHORITY TO IGNORE DETERMINATION MADE BY AN APPOINTED...