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ASSUMPTION OF RISK DOCTRINE NO LONGER APPLIES TO ANY ACTIONS OTHER THAN THOSE STEMMING FROM ATHLETIC AND RECREATIONAL ACTIVITIES.

The Second Department noted that the doctrine of assumption of the risk no longer applies in any context other than athletic or recreational activities. Defendant attempted to apply the doctrine to a breach of contract action:

The defendant moved for summary judgment dismissing the amended complaint insofar as asserted against her. Relying on Turcotte v Fell (68 NY2d 432), she contended that the plaintiff, by agreeing to enter into the joint annuity contract, necessarily assumed the risk of pecuniary injury. The Supreme Court denied the motion.

The defense of assumption of risk was abolished in 1975 with the adoption of CPLR 1411 … . Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals has explained “that a limited vestige of the assumption of the risk doctrine—referred to as primary’ assumption of the risk—survived the enactment of CPLR 1411 as a defense to tort recovery in cases involving certain types of athletic or recreational activities” … .

Here, as the allegations in the amended complaint have nothing to do with athletic or recreational activities contemplated by the primary assumption of risk doctrine … , it follows that the defendant’s reliance on Turcotte v Fell (68 NY2d 432) is misplaced, and her purported assumption of risk defense is barred by CPLR 1411. Ballow v Lincoln Fin. Corp., 2016 NY Slip Op 04009, 2nd Dept 5-25-16

 

CONTRACT LAW (ASSUMPTION OF RISK DOCTRINE NO LONGER APPLIES TO ANY ACTIONS OTHER THAN THOSE STEMMING FROM ATHLETIC AND RECREATIONAL ACTIVITIES)/ASSUMPTION OF THE RISK (ASSUMPTION OF RISK DOCTRINE NO LONGER APPLIES TO ANY ACTIONS OTHER THAN THOSE STEMMING FROM ATHLETIC AND RECREATIONAL ACTIVITIES)

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