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MOTION TO DISMISS THE COMPLAINT IN THIS FORECLOSURE ACTION FOR FAILURE TO TIMELY SERVE WITHIN THE 120 DAY WINDOW SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED, CRITERIA FOR ALLOWING LATE SERVICE EXPLAINED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendants’ motion pursuant to CPLR 306-b to dismiss the complaint in this foreclosure action (with regard to defendant Joseph) because it was not served within 120 days of filing should have been granted. The court explained the criteria for allowing extra time to serve:

As relevant here, CPLR 306-b provides that “[s]ervice of the summons and complaint . . . shall be made within one hundred twenty days after the commencement of the action.” Further, “[i]f service is not made upon a defendant within the time provided in this section, the court, upon motion, shall dismiss the action without prejudice as to that defendant, or upon good cause shown or in the interest of justice, extend the time for service.” ” Good cause’ and interest of justice’ are two separate and independent statutory standards” … . “To establish good cause, a plaintiff must demonstrate reasonable diligence in attempting service” … . “If good cause for an extension is not established, courts must consider the interest of justice’ standard of CPLR 306-b” … , which “requires a careful judicial analysis of the factual setting of the case and a balancing of the competing interests presented by the parties” … . “Unlike an extension request premised on good cause, a plaintiff [seeking an extension in the interest of justice] need not establish reasonably diligent efforts at service as a threshold matter” … . “However, the court may consider diligence, or lack thereof, along with any other relevant factor in making its determination, including expiration of the statute of limitations, the potentially meritorious nature of the cause of action, the length of delay in service, the promptness of a plaintiff’s request for the extension of time, and prejudice to defendant” … . “No one factor is determinative—the calculus of the court’s decision is dependent on the competing interests of the litigants and a clearly expressed desire by the Legislature that the interests of justice be served” … .

The plaintiff failed to establish that it exercised reasonably diligent efforts in attempting to effect proper service of process upon Joseph and, thus, failed to show good cause … . Further, the plaintiff failed to establish that an extension of time was warranted in the interest of justice … . Where the plaintiff’s delay in serving a defendant is protracted, and the defendant has no notice of the action for a protracted period of time, an inference of substantial prejudice arises …  The plaintiff failed to rebut the inference of substantial prejudice that arose due to its protracted delay in serving Joseph, as it failed to come forward with any proof that Joseph had notice of this action prior to being served more than 5½ years after the action was commenced … . Moreover, the plaintiff failed to explain its more than six-month delay in moving for relief pursuant to CPLR 306-b after it effectuated service upon Joseph … . Under theses circumstances, the plaintiff failed to establish its entitlement to an extension of time to serve Joseph under the interest of justice standard … , and its motion should have been denied. Wells Fargo Bank, NA v Barrella, 2018 NY Slip Op 07486, Second Dept 11-7-18

FORECLOSURE (MOTION TO DISMISS THE COMPLAINT IN THIS FORECLOSURE ACTION FOR FAILURE TO TIMELY SERVE WITHIN THE 120 DAY WINDOW SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED, CRITERIA FOR ALLOWING LATE SERVICE EXPLAINED (SECOND DEPT))/CIVIL PROCEDURE (MOTION TO DISMISS THE COMPLAINT IN THIS FORECLOSURE ACTION FOR FAILURE TO TIMELY SERVE WITHIN THE 120 DAY WINDOW SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED, CRITERIA FOR ALLOWING LATE SERVICE EXPLAINED (SECOND DEPT))/CPLR 306-b MOTION TO DISMISS THE COMPLAINT IN THIS FORECLOSURE ACTION FOR FAILURE TO TIMELY SERVE WITHIN THE 120 DAY WINDOW SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED, CRITERIA FOR ALLOWING LATE SERVICE EXPLAINED (SECOND DEPT))

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