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THE PHRASE ‘WITHIN FIVE DAYS’ IN CPLR 511, A CHANGE OF VENUE STATUTE, DOES NOT IMPOSE A WAITING PERIOD FOR A MOTION TO CHANGE VENUE, THE MOTION MAY BE MADE WITHIN THE FIVE DAYS (THIRD DEPT), ​

The Third Department, over a partial dissent, determined that the phrase “within five days” in a change of venue statute (CPLR 511) did not impose a five day waiting period:

Asserting that Ulster County was an improper venue for the proceeding, the Steeles served a timely written demand that the proceeding be tried in Oswego County (see CPLR 511 [b]). Four days later, the Steeles moved, in Ulster County, to change venue of the proceeding to Oswego County. The Aarons argue that the Steeles, by failing to wait five days after their demand to allow the Aarons an opportunity to provide a written consent to change venue, failed to comply with the statutory procedure and thereby were not entitled to a change of venue as of right. This argument is based on an interpretation that the language “unless within five days” places a hold on the defendant’s obligation to make a motion, during which time the defendant must simply wait for the plaintiff to respond to the demand (CPLR 511 [b]). We disagree with that interpretation of the statute.

The Aarons’ argument appears to focus exclusively on the phrase “unless within five days.” However, a plaintiff can choose not to respond to the demand, so the defendant may be sitting and waiting for nothing. In our view, the five-day window is a time limit on the plaintiff only, and the defendant is not required to refrain from doing anything during that period. Instead, the limits placed on a defendant under CPLR 511 (b) — other than the 15-day limit to move for change of venue — are contingent on whatever response the plaintiff may provide, rather than a five-day time period. While the five days are a limit on the plaintiff’s ability to respond to the demand, the defendant retains the ability to make the venue motion “unless . . . [the] plaintiff serves a written consent” agreeing to the venue selected by the defendant (CPLR 511 [b]). In other words, the important occurrence for the defendant is the plaintiff granting consent, not the passage of days. If the plaintiff consents to the demanded change in venue, the defendant may not move for such relief. In a situation where the defendant made a motion before the end of the plaintiff’s five-day response window and the plaintiff thereafter consented, the defendant would have to withdraw the motion (which would be unnecessary at that point anyway). Matter of Aaron v Steele, 2018 NY Slip Op 07393, Third Dept 11-1-18

CIVIL PROCEDURE (VENUE, THE PHRASE ‘WITHIN FIVE DAYS’ IN CPLR 511, A CHANGE OF VENUE STATUTE, DOES NOT IMPOSE A WAITING PERIOD FOR A MOTION TO CHANGE VENUE, THE MOTION MAY BE MADE WITHIN THE FIVE DAYS (THIRD DEPT))/CPLR 511 (VENUE, THE PHRASE ‘WITHIN FIVE DAYS’ IN CPLR 511, A CHANGE OF VENUE STATUTE, DOES NOT IMPOSE A WAITING PERIOD FOR A MOTION TO CHANGE VENUE, THE MOTION MAY BE MADE WITHIN THE FIVE DAYS (THIRD DEPT))/VENUE (THE PHRASE ‘WITHIN FIVE DAYS’ IN CPLR 511, A CHANGE OF VENUE STATUTE, DOES NOT IMPOSE A WAITING PERIOD FOR A MOTION TO CHANGE VENUE, THE MOTION MAY BE MADE WITHIN THE FIVE DAYS (THIRD DEPT))

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