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PLAINTIFF DID NOT SUBMIT ADMISSIBLE PROOF OF DEFAULT, MOTION TO INTERVENE WAS UNTIMELY, JUDICIARY LAW 489 WAS NOT VIOLATED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined that the plaintiff did not submit admissible proof that defendant was in default. The evidence did not meet the business records exception to the hearsay rule. The court also held that a nonparty’s motion to intervene was properly denied as untimely and the Judiciary Law 489 affirmative defense was properly struck. Judiciary Law 489 prohibits buying another’s debt for the purpose of bringing a court action, but debts exceeding $500,000 are exempt. The debts purchased here exceeded $500,000:

The determination to deny Fulton Holdings’ motion for leave to intervene in the action was a provident exercise of discretion. “Intervention under CPLR 1012 and 1013 requires a timely motion” … . Here, Fulton Holdings’ motion was not timely, as it was not made until approximately 14 months after Fulton Holdings had notice that the foreclosure action was pending … . …

Here, the plaintiff failed to submit evidence of default in admissible form. To evince the mortgagor’s default, the plaintiff submitted the affidavits of Igor Fleyshmakher, the plaintiff’s managing member, and Frank Quintana, the president of 179 Court Street Holding Corp. (hereinafter 179 Court), a prior holder of the mortgage. Fleyshmakher and Quintana both attested to the date of the last payment allegedly received on the mortgage. However, the plaintiff failed to demonstrate the admissibility, under the business records exception to the hearsay rule, of any records relied upon by Fleyshmakher and Quintana (see CPLR 4518[a]…). Neither Fleyshmakher nor Quintana laid a foundation for, or even identified, the records upon which they relied. Moreover, neither the plaintiff nor 179 Court acquired its interest in the mortgage until after the alleged default date. Thus, neither Fleyshmakher nor Quintana could have established the loan’s payment history up to and including the date of default by relying on their respective employers’ records. Neither Fleyshmakher nor Quintana asserted that they consulted or relied on the records of 179 Court’s predecessor-in-interest. Under these circumstances, the plaintiff failed to establish, prima facie, the mortgagor’s default … . Fulton Holding Group, LLC v Lindoff, 2018 NY Slip Op 07096, Second Dept 10-24-18

FORECLOSURE (PLAINTIFF DID NOT SUBMIT ADMISSIBLE PROOF OF DEFAULT, MOTION TO INTERVENE WAS UNTIMELY, JUDICIARY LAW 489 WAS NOT VIOLATED (SECOND DEPT))/EVIDENCE (FORECLOSURE, PLAINTIFF DID NOT SUBMIT ADMISSIBLE PROOF OF DEFAULT, MOTION TO INTERVENE WAS UNTIMELY, JUDICIARY LAW 489 WAS NOT VIOLATED (SECOND DEPT))/HEARSAY (BUSINESS RECORDS EXCEPTION, FORECLOSURE, PLAINTIFF DID NOT SUBMIT ADMISSIBLE PROOF OF DEFAULT, MOTION TO INTERVENE WAS UNTIMELY, JUDICIARY LAW 489 WAS NOT VIOLATED (SECOND DEPT))/BUSINESS RECORDS EXCEPTION TO THE HEARSAY RULE (FORECLOSURE, PLAINTIFF DID NOT SUBMIT ADMISSIBLE PROOF OF DEFAULT, MOTION TO INTERVENE WAS UNTIMELY, JUDICIARY LAW 489 WAS NOT VIOLATED (SECOND DEPT))/CIVIL PROCEDURE (FORECLOSURE, PLAINTIFF DID NOT SUBMIT ADMISSIBLE PROOF OF DEFAULT, MOTION TO INTERVENE WAS UNTIMELY, JUDICIARY LAW 489 WAS NOT VIOLATED (SECOND DEPT))/CPLR 4518 (FORECLOSURE, PLAINTIFF DID NOT SUBMIT ADMISSIBLE PROOF OF DEFAULT, MOTION TO INTERVENE WAS UNTIMELY, JUDICIARY LAW 489 WAS NOT VIOLATED (SECOND DEPT))/CPLR 1012, 1013 (FORECLOSURE, PLAINTIFF DID NOT SUBMIT ADMISSIBLE PROOF OF DEFAULT, MOTION TO INTERVENE WAS UNTIMELY, JUDICIARY LAW 489 WAS NOT VIOLATED (SECOND DEPT))/DEBTOR-CREDITOR (JUDICIARY LAW 489, PLAINTIFF DID NOT SUBMIT ADMISSIBLE PROOF OF DEFAULT, MOTION TO INTERVENE WAS UNTIMELY, JUDICIARY LAW 489 WAS NOT VIOLATED (SECOND DEPT))/JUDICIARY 489 FORECLOSURE, PLAINTIFF DID NOT SUBMIT ADMISSIBLE PROOF OF DEFAULT, MOTION TO INTERVENE WAS UNTIMELY, JUDICIARY LAW 489 WAS NOT VIOLATED (SECOND DEPT))

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