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PETITION FOR SANCTIONS AGAINST DEFENDANT’S ATTORNEY FOR FRIVOLOUS CONDUCT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED, DEFENDANT’S ATTORNEY, WITHOUT PROOF, CONTENDED THE PRENUPTIAL AGREEMENT HAD BEEN REPLACED, APPARENTLY IN ORDER TO DELAY THE PROCEEDINGS (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff’s application to impose sanctions against defendant’s attorney for frivolous conduct should have have been granted:

… [T]he Supreme Court improvidently exercised its discretion in denying the plaintiff’s application to impose sanctions in the form of attorneys’ fees and expenses against the defendant’s attorney pursuant to 22 NYCRR 130-1.1. Although “[a]n agreement between spouses or prospective spouses which is fair on its face will be enforced according to its terms unless there is proof of fraud, duress, overreaching, or unconscionability” … , the defendant, through her attorney, moved to set aside the prenuptial agreement contending, in effect, that there had been a novation such that the prenuptial agreement had been replaced by the affidavit of support. The defendant’s attorney provided no legal authority supporting this contention. Even though the court granted that branch of the plaintiff’s cross motion which was, in effect, to preclude the defendant from seeking to set aside the parties’ prenuptial agreement, the defendant’s attorney later attempted, at the nonjury trial, to question the plaintiff about the affidavit of support, arguing, in effect, that the affidavit of support replaced the prenuptial agreement. The defense then rested without presenting evidence.

The conduct of the defendant’s attorney was frivolous within the meaning of 22 NYCRR 130-1.1(c). The defendant’s attorney continued to advance his contention relating to the affidavit of support, which was completely without merit in law, in contravention of the Supreme Court’s prior ruling. Moreover, that contention could not be supported by a reasonable argument for an extension, modification, or reversal of existing law, and the conduct of the defendant’s attorney appears to have been undertaken primarily to delay or prolong the resolution of the litigation … . Tamburello v Tamburello, 2018 NY Slip Op 06961, Second Dept 10-17-18

FAMILY LAW (PETITION FOR SANCTIONS AGAINST DEFENDANT’S ATTORNEY FOR FRIVOLOUS CONDUCT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED, DEFENDANT’S ATTORNEY, WITHOUT PROOF, CONTENDED THE PRENUPTIAL AGREEMENT HAD BEEN REPLACED, APPARENTLY IN ORDER TO DELAY THE PROCEEDINGS (SECOND DEPT))/CONTRACT LAW (FAMILY LAW, PETITION FOR SANCTIONS AGAINST DEFENDANT’S ATTORNEY FOR FRIVOLOUS CONDUCT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED, DEFENDANT’S ATTORNEY, WITHOUT PROOF, CONTENDED THE PRENUPTIAL AGREEMENT HAD BEEN REPLACED, APPARENTLY IN ORDER TO DELAY THE PROCEEDINGS (SECOND DEPT))/ATTORNEYS (SANCTIONS, PETITION FOR SANCTIONS AGAINST DEFENDANT’S ATTORNEY FOR FRIVOLOUS CONDUCT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED, DEFENDANT’S ATTORNEY, WITHOUT PROOF, CONTENDED THE PRENUPTIAL AGREEMENT HAD BEEN REPLACED, APPARENTLY IN ORDER TO DELAY THE PROCEEDINGS (SECOND DEPT))/FRIVOLOUS CONDUCT (ATTORNEYS, SANCTIONS, PETITION FOR SANCTIONS AGAINST DEFENDANT’S ATTORNEY FOR FRIVOLOUS CONDUCT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED, DEFENDANT’S ATTORNEY, WITHOUT PROOF, CONTENDED THE PRENUPTIAL AGREEMENT HAD BEEN REPLACED, APPARENTLY IN ORDER TO DELAY THE PROCEEDINGS (SECOND DEPT))

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