You are here: / / PAYOR OF VOLUNTARY SPOUSAL SUPPORT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GIVEN CREDIT FOR THOSE...

PAYOR OF VOLUNTARY SPOUSAL SUPPORT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GIVEN CREDIT FOR THOSE PAYMENTS IN THIS DIVORCE ACTION (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the voluntary support and legal-obligations payments made by husband to wife should have been credited against the arrears owed by him:

Voluntary payments made for the support and legal obligations of a spouse should be applied as a credit to the calculation of arrears owed by the payor spouse… . When the payor spouse relieves the other spouse from paying obligations for which the other spouse would be responsible, such payments must be considered as satisfying, in whole or part, maintenance and/or child support … . Here, the defendant is entitled to credits against his maintenance obligation as established in the judgment of divorce with regard to the plaintiff’s share of such expenses such as mortgage, real estate taxes, and automobile insurance payments … .

We disagree with the plaintiff’s contention that the defendant’s voluntary payments made pursuant to the preliminary conference order, which does not specifically enumerate the payments to be made, cannot qualify as “payments of pendente lite spousal maintenance actually made pursuant to Court Order.” The preliminary conference order, as so-ordered by the Supreme Court, plainly contemplated that the defendant would continue to make voluntary payments for the benefit of the plaintiff and the parties’ children. To deny the payor spouse a credit for payments made on account of the other spouse’s expenses would not only be inequitable by providing a windfall for the benefitted spouse, but it would also discourage voluntary support payments during the pendency of matrimonial actions and likely cause a precipitous rise of pendente lite motion practice by nonmonied spouses. Just as a party who unnecessarily prolongs a matrimonial action should not be rewarded, common sense dictates that a party who avoids unnecessary motion practice and preserves assets and time by agreeing to voluntarily pay the expenses of the other party should not be punished by being denied appropriate credits therefor. Stern v Stern, 2018 NY Slip Op 06959, Second Dept 10-18-18

FAMILY LAW (PAYOR OF VOLUNTARY SUPPORT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GIVEN CREDIT FOR THOSE PAYMENTS IN THIS DIVORCE ACTION (SECOND DEPT))/SUPPORT (FAMILY LAW, DIVORCE, PAYOR OF VOLUNTARY SUPPORT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GIVEN CREDIT FOR THOSE PAYMENTS IN THIS DIVORCE ACTION (SECOND DEPT))/VOLUNTARY SUPPORT PAYMENTS (FAMILY LAW, DIVORCE, PAYOR OF VOLUNTARY SUPPORT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GIVEN CREDIT FOR THOSE PAYMENTS IN THIS DIVORCE ACTION (SECOND DEPT))/SPOUSAL SUPPORT (FAMILY LAW, DIVORCE, PAYOR OF VOLUNTARY SUPPORT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GIVEN CREDIT FOR THOSE PAYMENTS IN THIS DIVORCE ACTION (SECOND DEPT))/MAINTENANCE (FAMILY LAW, DIVORCE, PAYOR OF VOLUNTARY SUPPORT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GIVEN CREDIT FOR THOSE PAYMENTS IN THIS DIVORCE ACTION (SECOND DEPT))

You might also like
HERE THE MARINA OWNER SERVED THE BOAT OWNER WITH A NOTICE OF SALE (FOR FAILURE TO PAY STORAGE FEES) BY MAIL; THE LIEN LAW REQUIRES AN INITIAL ATTEMPT AT PERSONAL SERVICE OF THE NOTICE OF SALE BEFORE RESORTING TO SERVICE BY MAIL; THE FAILURE TO MAKE AN ATTEMPT AT PERSONAL SERVICE BEFORE SELLING THE BOAT VIOLATED THE LIEN LAW; THE SALE OF THE BOAT THEREFORE CONSTITUTED CONVERSION (SECOND DEPT).
HERE IN THIS MED MAL ACTION, THE COVID-RELATED IMMUNITY CODIFIED IN THE EMERGENCY OR DISASTER TREATMENT PROTECTION ACT (EDTPA) WARRANTED SUMMARY JUDGMENT DISMISSING THE CAUSES OF ACTION STEMMING FROM THE TREATMENT OF PLAINTIFF BY DEFENDANT PHYSICIAN IN APRIL 2020, BUT NOT THE CAUSE OF ACTION STEMMING FROM THE TREATMENT OF PLAINTIFF BY DEFENDANT PHYSICIAN IN MARCH 2020, BEFORE HIS OFFICE WAS CLOSED PURSUANT TO THE COVID EMERGENCY DECLARATION (SECOND DEPT).
CLAIMANT WAS INJURED WHEN A TRUCK STRUCK THE BASKET OF THE MAN LIFT SHE WAS USING; THE FACT THAT CLAIMANT DIDN’T FALL FROM THE BASKET DID NOT WARRANT THE DISMISSAL OF THE LABOR LAW 240(1) CAUSE OF ACTION (SECOND DEPT).
ATTORNEY FOR THE SEVERELY DISABLED CHILD COULD CONTINUE TO MAKE FOSTER CARE AND MEDICAL CARE DECISIONS FOR THE CHILD AFTER THE CHILD’S EIGHTEENTH BIRTHDAY, APPOINTMENT OF A GUARDIAN IS UNNECESSARY (SECOND DEPT).
BANK DID NOT DEMONSTRATE COMPLIANCE WITH THE NOTICE PROVISIONS OF RPAPL 1304 IN THIS FORECLOSURE PROCEEDING, BANK’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).
DOCTRINE OF EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL APPLIED TO DENY NYC TRANSIT AUTHORITY’S MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO SERVE A NOTICE OF CLAIM; THE NOTICE HAD BEEN TIMELY SERVED ON THE METROPOLITAN TRANSIT AUTHORITY AND A 50-h HEARING HAD BEEN HELD.
FAILURE TO FOLLOW O’RAMA PROCEDURE FOR JURY NOTES REQUIRED REVERSAL, MODE OF PROCEEDINGS ERROR DID NOT REQUIRE PRESERVATION (SECOND DEPT).
Defendant’s Actions In Driving Under the Influence and Causing a Collision Did Not Support Convictions for Offenses Requiring Proof of a Depraved Indifference to Human Life

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2025 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

PEOPLE’S REQUEST FOR AN UPWARD DEPARTURE SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED... PETITION FOR SANCTIONS AGAINST DEFENDANT’S ATTORNEY FOR FRIVOLOUS CONDUCT...