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Ambiguity in Separation Agreement Construed Against Drafter

The Second Department determined the ambiguity in a separation agreement about whether the decedent was obligated to maintain life insurance policy should be construed against the decedent, whose attorney drafted the document:

Here, the separation agreement was ambiguous as to whether the decedent’s obligation to maintain a life insurance policy naming the defendants as beneficiaries extended beyond the date of the defendants’ emancipation. However, it is undisputed that the decedent’s attorney drafted the separation agreement. Pursuant to the doctrine of contra proferentem, the Supreme Court should have construed the ambiguity against the decedent’s estate … .  DeAngelis v DeAngelis, 2013 NY Slip Op, 2011-08587, Index No 8485/08, 2nd Dept 3-27-13

 

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