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Defendants Accused of Crimes Not Listed in the Controlling Statutes Are Not Eligible for the Judicial Diversion Program—The Statutes Do Not Allow for Judicial Discretion

In a full-fledged opinion by Justice Centra, the Fourth Department determined a Monroe County Court Judge exceeded his authority by allowing defendants accused of crimes not listed in the relevant statute to participate in the judicial diversion program.  The Court wrote:

CPL 216.00 (1) provides as follows: “ ‘Eligible defendant’ means any person who stands charged in an indictment or a superior court information with a class B, C, D or E felony offense defined in article two hundred twenty or two hundred twenty-one of the penal law or any other specified offense as defined in subdivision four of section 410.91…’”

It is undisputed that respondent defendants were not charged with any offenses under Penal Law §§ 220 or 221, or any specified offense in CPL 410.91. In our opinion, that ends the inquiry, and respondent defendants are not eligible for judicial diversion. It is well settled that “ ‘[w]here the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, courts must give effect to its plain meaning’ ” ….Likewise, “statutory interpretation always begins with the words of the statute” … .* * *

… [W]e agree with petitioner that she is also entitled to declaratory relief . “Although a declaratory judgment often revolves around a particular set of facts, [t]he remedy is available in cases where a constitutional question is involved or the legality or meaning of a statute is in question and no question of fact is involved” … . [T]he “criminal court’s ruling must have an obvious effect extending far beyond the matter pending before it so that it is likely that the issue will arise again with the same result in other cases” … .

[The opinion includes discussion of the nature and application of petitions for mandamus to compel and prohibition, and the County Court Judge’s argument that the use of judicial discretion re: the diversion program is allowed by statute.] Matter of Doorley v Hon John L. DeMarco, et al, 122, OP12-01563, 4th Dept. 3-22-13

 

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