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Stuck Door Could Constitute a “Dangerous Condition”

In finding that a stuck door could constitute a “dangerous condition,” the Fourth Department wrote:

Plaintiff commenced this action seeking damages for injuries he allegedly sustained when, in the course of his employment, he was delivering a package to defendant’s property. He attempted to open a door but, according to plaintiff, the door would not open because it was stuck and defendant had prior notice that “the door stuck on occasion.” Defendant moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the sole ground that the “condition alleged by Plaintiff, [i.e.], the door that would not open on the date of the accident, is not an inherently dangerous condition giving rise to a duty in tort.” We conclude that Supreme Court erred in granting the motion.

As the Court of Appeals has written, the issue “whether a dangerous or defective condition exists on the property of another so as to create liability depends on the peculiar facts and circumstances of each case and is generally [one] of fact for the jury” … . With respect to summary judgment motions, it is well established that “[a] motion for summary judgment must be denied ‘if there is any significant doubt as to the existence of a triable issue [of fact], or if there is even arguably such an issue’ . . . Moreover, summary judgment is seldom appropriate in a negligence action” … . Bielicki v Excel Industries, Inc., 335, CA 12-01494, 4th Dept. 3-22-13

 

 

 

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