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THE INDUSTRIAL CODE REQUIRED A GUARD ON THE SAW WHICH INJURED PLAINTIFF; DEFENDANT WAS NOT ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT BASED ON THE ALLEGATION THERE WAS NO PLACE TO INSTALL A GUARD ON THE SAW.

The plaintiff was injured when he was struck by part of a saw blade which broke off from the hand-held reciprocating saw he was using. A provision of the Industrial Code, with a couple of exceptions not relevant to this case, requires guards on hand-held saws. The saw used by plaintiff did not have any guards. Defendant alleged there was no place to attach such a guard on the saw and the plaintiff testified he had never seen a reciprocating saw with a guard. The First Department upheld the motion court's finding that the Industrial Code applied to the saw in question as a matter of law. Therefore defendant's motion for summary judgment was properly denied:

We agree with the motion court that defendant failed to satisfy its burden of establishing that section 23-1.12(c) does not apply to this case. “[T]o support a claim under Labor Law § 241(6) . . . the particular [Industrial Code] provision relied upon by a plaintiff must mandate compliance with concrete specifications and not simply declare general safety standards or reiterate common-law principles” … . “The interpretation of an Industrial Code regulation and determination as to whether a particular condition is within the scope of the regulation present questions of law for the court” … .

Industrial Code § 23-1.12(c)(1) is sufficiently specific to support a Labor Law § 241(6) claim and is applicable because plaintiff was using a “power-driven, hand-operated saw” at the time of his accident. Defendant sought to use plaintiff's deposition testimony that he had never seen a blade cover or guard on that type of saw as expert testimony to establish that the reciprocating saw plaintiff was given was not covered by the Industrial Code provision in question … . Defendant, however, cannot avoid its duty to comply with section 23-1.12(c)(1) by asserting that the saw used by plaintiff had no base plate and could not accommodate a self adjusting guard. Section 23-1.12(c)(1) obligated defendant to ensure that the “power-driven, hand-operated saw” provided to plaintiff to perform his job was secured with guard plates to cover the saw blade. As the motion court observed, “[T]o interpret the regulation in any other manner [] would be to ineffectualize the regulation because employers, owners and contractors would only use tools that would minimize their liability.” Accordingly, we find that Industrial Code (12 NYCRR) § 23-1.12(c)(1)) is applicable to this case as a matter of law. Kelmendi v 157 Hudson St., LLC, 2016 NY Slip Op 01903, 1st Dept 3-17-16

LABOR LAW (INDUSTRIAL CODE REQUIRED A GUARD ON THE SAW WHICH INJURED PLAINTIFF, DEFENDANT NOT ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT BASED ON THE CLAIM THERE WAS NO PLACE TO INSTALL A GUARD ON THE SAW)/INDUSTRIAL CODE (LABOR LAW, INDUSTRIAL CODE REQUIRED A GUARD ON THE SAW WHICH INJURED PLAINTIFF, DEFENDANT NOT ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT BASED ON THE CLAIM THERE WAS NO PLACE TO INSTALL A GUARD ON THE SAW)

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