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Criteria for Common-Law Indemnification Explained

In upholding Supreme Court’s determination that a cause of action for common-law indemnification should not be dismissed, the Third Department explained:

Common-law indemnification …is a quasi-contract claim in which a  contract is implied in law in order to avoid unjust enrichment, accomplished  by  shifting a  loss by  “placing the obligation where  in equity it belongs” …..   Common-law  indemnification avoids  unfairness  and  unjust  enrichment  by  “recogniz[ing]  that [a] person  who,  in whole  or in part, has discharged a duty which is owed  by  him  but  which  as between  himself and  another should have been discharged by  the other, is entitled to indemnity” …  It “requires a showing that [the] plaintiff and [the] defendant[] owed a duty to third parties, and that [the] plaintiff discharged the duty which, as between [the] plaintiff and [the] defendant[], should have been discharged by [the] defendant[]” … .Murray Bresky Consultants, Ltd v New York Compensation Manager’s Inc, 515591, 3rd Dept, 5-9-13

 

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